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Abstract 
Can greater control over earned income incentivize women to work and infuence gender 
norms? In collaboration with Indian government partners, we provided rural women 
with individual bank accounts and randomly varied whether their wages from a public 
workfare program were directly deposited into these accounts or into the male household 
head’s account (the status quo). Women in a random subset of villages were also 
trained on account use. In the short run, relative to women just o˙ered bank accounts, 
those who also received direct deposit and training increased their labor supply in the 
public and private sectors. In the long run, gender norms liberalized: women who 
received direct deposit and training became more accepting of female work, and their 
husbands perceived fewer social costs to having a wife who works. These e˙ects were 
concentrated in households with otherwise lower levels of, and stronger norms against, 
female work. Women in these households also worked more in the long run and became 
more empowered. These patterns are consistent with models of household decision-
making in which increases in bargaining power from greater control over income interact 
with, and infuence, gender norms. 
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1 Introduction 
Female labor force participation remains low and stagnant in many emerging economies, 
with India a particularly stark example. Despite robust economic growth, the female labor 
force participation (FLFP) rate has declined from 37 percent in 1990 to 28 percent in 2015, 
making Indian women some of the least employed in the world (ILO, 2015). Yet, nearly 
one third of Indian housewives express an interest in working (Fletcher et al., 2017). Simply 
bringing these women into the labor force would increase Indian FLFP by nearly 80 percent.1 
What stops so many women who want to work from joining the labor force? 
One possibility is gender norms around work roles – in particular, the idea that a wife 
who works outside the home is a source of social stigma or shame for her husband, who is 
expected to earn enough to support his family (Boudet et al., 2012; Bernhardt et al., 2018). 
When internalized by women, such norms can directly lower their utility of working (see e.g. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000)). And, when internalized by men, norms may reduce women’s 
work through intra-household channels (Bertrand et al., 2015). In this paper we ask whether 
policies that strengthen women’s control over their earnings increase their ability to overcome 
these norms and work outside the home, and, in turn, shift norms around women’s work. 
To this end, we leverage a large-scale randomized controlled trial in 197 village clusters, 
known as gram panchayats (GPs), in the Northern part of Madhya Pradesh (MP)–an area 
with restrictive gender norms.2 Our study was conducted in partnership with state and bank 
authorities and focused on India’s federal workfare program, the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), which provided rural households with 
a given amount of work per annum at a fxed wage. 
The program status quo was for workers’ wages to be deposited into a bank account 
owned by the male household head. In a random subset of GPs in our study area, banks 
made a push to open individual accounts for women. In half of these GPs, we enabled 
direct deposit of MGNREGS wages in these accounts. Finally, we cross-randomized a short 
training program that gave women basic instructions for using last-mile banking providers.3 
Overall, our interventions disrupted the status quo by randomly varying whether women’s 
1Drawing women into the labor force may address other gender inequities. Female employment has been 
shown to delay marriage, increase female work aspirations, improve child health, and reduce the male:female 
sex ratio (Qian, 2008; Atkin, 2009; Jensen, 2012; Heath and Mobarak, 2015). In the United States, rapid 
growth in female labor force participation preceded important changes in norms regarding gender roles in 
both the economy and the household (Goldin, 2006). 
2MP is the sixth largest and eighth poorest of India’s 29 states, with adult male and female rural labor 
force participation rates of 84 percent and 29 percent (close to the national averages) (RBI, 2016). GPs are 
the lowest level of government in India, and typically comprise of 2-5 villages in MP. 
3“Last-mile” banking is defned as access to a bank kiosk (termed customer service point, or CSP) within 
5 kilometers of home. 
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wages were directly deposited into their own bank accounts, giving them greater control over 
earnings, or deposited in their husbands’ accounts as usual. 
To isolate the e˙ect of increasing women’s control of own income while holding fnan-
cial inclusion constant, we compare outcomes for women who only received bank accounts 
(“accounts only”) to those who additionally received direct deposit of MGNREGS wages and 
bank account training (“direct deposit and training”).4 Using a combination of administrative 
data and household surveys, we obtain three sets of results. 
First, adding direct deposit and training to bank account provision led to sizeable short-
and long-run gains in female fnancial inclusion. Three years after the intervention we observe 
0.13 and 0.19 standard deviation unit increases in an index of account use and an index of 
banking autonomy, respectively. The former focuses on a woman’s account activity while the 
latter captures whether a woman goes to the bank on her own and is comfortable transacting 
independently. The gains in autonomy are particularly notable, given the limits on women’s 
mobility and agency in our setting. 
Second, direct deposit and training increased women’s labor supply and led to associated 
empowerment gains among a subset of women. One year after implementing the interven-
tions, treated women scored 0.16 standard deviation units higher on an index of labor market 
engagement. This refects higher rates of MGNREGS and private sector work. Treatment 
e˙ects are larger (at 0.21 standard deviation units) among women who were least attached 
to the labor market, proxied by never having worked for MGNREGS, at baseline. We refer 
to these women as “socially constrained” to refect that they are less likely to work, less 
empowered, and their husbands are more likely to subscribe to norms against female work. 
Three years later, socially constrained women continued to show a 0.19 standard deviation 
units increase in the labor supply index. Alongside, they reported short- and long-run gains 
in socioeconomic empowerment, which included increased economic agency over purchases 
and, in the long run, greater mobility. After three years, their empowerment score was in-
creased by 0.14 standard deviation units, e˙ectively closing the empowerment gap between 
constrained and unconstrained women. 
Finally, gender norms became more progressive in the longer run, though with di˙erences 
across genders in terms of which norms liberalize. Using a series of attitudinal and vignette-
based measures, we separately measured actual and perceived norms. Actual gender norms 
capture average personal beliefs about women and work. Perceived norms refect individual 
perceptions of community members’ beliefs about women and work. Three years after the 
intervention, the stated beliefs (actual norms) of direct deposit and training women were more 
4Supplementary analysis suggests that both treatment components–training and direct deposit facilities– 
mattered, but we are underpowered to separately identify contributions of the two components. 
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progressive than women in accounts-only areas, with an actual norms index 0.11 standard 
deviation units higher than other women. Women’s perceived norms showed some positive 
change: on average, they reported that the community is more accepting of working women. 
In contrast, while their husbands’ actual norms remained unchanged, men’s perceived norms 
signifcantly liberalized, with greater perceived acceptance of working women’s husbands, 
suggesting that women may in part be held back from working by men’s misperceptions of 
the stigma they would su˙er. Consistent with our other results, norms shifts are concentrated 
among socially constrained women. 
The labor impacts of our intervention are inconsistent with the predictions of a neoclas-
sical model of labor supply with unitary decision making. Since direct deposit and training 
had no impact on market wages or account ownership, this model predicts that household 
labor supply should have been una˙ected.5 If we instead consider the framework of collective 
household bargaining, our intervention can be described as increasing a woman’s bargaining 
power within the household. Greater bargaining power should, however, lower rather than 
raise a woman’s labor supply via the associated income e˙ect. The income e˙ect associated 
with greater bargaining power for women is, for instance, cited as an explanation for the 
reduction in women’s work associated with sex ratio changes (Angrist, 2002), improved al-
imony rights (Rangel, 2006) and divorce laws friendlier to women (Chiappori et al., 2002; 
Stevenson, 2008). 
Instead, our fndings are consistent with collective models in which bargaining power gains 
from improving a woman’s ability to control her labor income interact with, and infuence, 
gender norms within the household. We build on Akerlof and Kranton (2000), who propose 
a model in which individuals’ sense of “identity” dictates utility changes based on whether 
actions align or clash with identity norms. In our context, female work may violate identity 
norms of both women, who are expected to be housewives, and men, who are expected to be 
breadwinners (Bertrand et al., 2015). Increasing the bargaining power of a woman who does 
not desire work because it violates her own identity norms will not encourage her to enter the 
labor market. However, if normative costs internalized by men are binding, increasing female 
bargaining power may draw some women into the labor market who previously stayed at 
home to respect their husbands’ wishes. Direct deposit and training may have also increased 
women’s utility from work, either by improving their ability to control their own income 
(see, e.g., the non-cooperative model in Heath and Tan (2015)). Importantly, our framework 
predicts that if normative barriers are binding, labor supply impacts should be largest on 
the extensive margin – that is, among women least attached to the labor market at baseline 
– , which is what we fnd in practice. 
5We fnd no evidence that the direct deposit and training treatment eased savings constraints. 
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Our study sheds light on the link between economic policy, female labor force participa-
tion, and norms. To date, much of the work on FLFP norms in economics has focused on 
describing norms, their transmission, and their consequences.6 A smaller literature studies 
the impact of interventions that explicitly attempt to change actual or perceived norms.7 
Here, perceived norms are typically thought to be easier to change than actual norms, which 
are often tied to deep-seated cultural beliefs (Tankard and Paluck, 2016). We demonstrate 
that large-scale policies that alter behavioral incentives, but do not explicitly target norms, 
can precipitate normative shifts over a relatively short time horizon. 
Our study also speaks to a body of work that evaluates design modifcations for social 
protection programs. Existing research largely focuses on the eÿciency of program delivery 
(e.g. Muralidharan et al. (2016); Aker et al. (2016); Banerjee et al. (2016); Bachas et al. 
(2016) examines impacts on fnancial inclusion). Our contribution is to demonstrate how 
gender targeting can impact both program outcomes (e.g. work days provided through 
MGNREGS) and also have indirect e˙ects on broader economic outcomes that have the 
potential to outlive the program (e.g. private-sector work, empowerment, and gender norms). 
A fnal link is to a body of literature showing how conditional cash transfer programs 
that target women can increase female bargaining power (Almås et al., 2018; Bobonis, 2009, 
2011; Attanasio and Lechene, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, none fnd increases in 
female labor force participation, possibly because the income transfers are sizable enough to 
reduce labor supply (Skoufas et al., 2013; Hasan, 2010). In contrast, other work fnds that 
productive asset transfers (coupled with additional support) can increase the labor supply 
of women in very poor households across a range of country contexts (Bandiera et al., 2017; 
Banerjee et al., 2015; Bedoya et al., 2019). None of these studies ask whether the programs 
alter norms limiting women’s work, however. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes gender norms, work oppor-
tunities, and MGNREGS in our study context, followed by a description of our experimental 
design. Section 3 lays out a conceptual framework for evaluating treatment e˙ects and our 
empirical strategy. In Section 4 we discuss treatment impacts on fnancial agency, women’s 
work and empowerment. In Section 5 we evaluate the longer-run impacts on gender norms 
and Section 6 concludes. 
6See, e.g. Fernandez et al. 2004; Fernandez and Fogli 2009; Alesina et al. 2013; Bertrand et al. 2015. 
7See Bursztyn et al. (2018) on FLFP norms, Dhar et al. (2018) on gender norms, and Green et al. (2019) 
on norms related to gender-based violence. 
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2 Experimental Context and Design 
2.1 Rural Work Opportunities in India 
Broadly, rural less-educated Indians have two work options: private-sector work (both self-
employment and wage labor) and MGNREGS work. In our setting, self-employment consists 
of individuals working on their land or engaging in animal husbandry.8 The most common 
o˙-farm private-sector employment for both genders is seasonal casual wage labor for a fxed 
daily or weekly wage, paid in cash. This work typically occurs on others’ land or construction 
sites and almost always pays more per day than MGNREGS work. 
The public workfare program, MGNREGS, entitles rural households to up to 100 days of 
work per year. On paper, the program is “demand-based”, in that individuals are supposed to 
place work requests with their local leader, who is obligated to arrange work opportunities. 
On the ground, the system is typically supply-driven: local leaders schedule work projects 
with some notion of worker demand (e.g. more projects occur in lean seasons), but not 
all households receive the opportunity to work (Dutta et al., 2012), and the 100 day cap is 
rarely binding.9 Nevertheless, MGNREGS is one of the largest household-level redistribution 
programs in India and, indeed, the world (Subbarao et al., 2012). 
MGNREGS mandates gender wage parity and provides work inside rural communities, an 
attractive proposition for mobility-constrained women. Despite this, its payment architecture 
runs the risk of discouraging female workers. In 2008, the Government of India directed states 
to transition from cash to electronic payment of MGNREGS wages into benefciary-owned 
bank accounts. The initial status quo was to deposit wages for all working members of a 
household into a single account, almost always owned by the male head of household. 
In late 2012, the Minister of Rural Development announced that a woman’s MGNREGS 
wages should be deposited into her individual bank account (Chatterji, 2016; UNWOMEN, 
2012). Appendix Figure B3 graphs the annual share of female MGNREGS workers whose 
wages are directly deposited into their individual account. For reference, we graph the 
national average, MP as a whole, and our study districts. It is clear that MP, and our study 
areas in particular, have been slow adopters of the policy, though the rate of individual 
payment has picked up since FY 2015-16. 
8Small businesses are rare: just four percent of women and seven percent of men reported any business 
activity in the year before our long-run survey. 
9The fraction of households working less than 100 days in MGNREGS administrative data (conditional 
on working at all) in our study area ranges from 80 percent to 96 percent between 2013 and 2017. We also 
observe households working more than 100 days, with limited bunching at 100 days. 
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2.2 Gender Norms Regarding Work and Mobility 
Aside from payment architecture, a key constraint on Indian women’s agency remains gender 
norms, especially when it comes to engaging with actors external to the household. The 
nationally representative 2011-2012 India Human Development Survey (IHDS) found that 
52 percent of adult women stated that their husband has the most say as to whether the 
woman works. During our study we tracked women in a randomly selected set of villages 
where we undertook no interventions (henceforth the control group). Data from our long-run 
survey suggests that our study sample is even more conservative: 70 percent of control group 
women stated their husband was the primary decision-maker in their work, and just half of 
women had gone to the local market alone in the past year. 
That said, there is substantial heterogeneity in actual and perceived gender norms. Figure 
1, which graphs the distribution of actual and perceived gender norms across communities 
(e.g. GPs) for the control group, demonstrates this. Panel A plots actual norms, specifcally 
the GP-wise distribution of the share of men (gray bars) and women (white bars) who agree 
with the statement “women cannot go out to work”. In the average GP, 23 percent of women 
and 34 percent of men agree with this statement, though there is substantial variation in 
average responses across communities. As norms are often maintained within caste and 
subcaste groups (Srinivas, 1995; Eswaran et al., 2013), this variation likely refects–at least 
in part–variation in the caste mix across GPs. 
Panel B plots perceived norms. We asked women what fraction of people in their com-
munity would speak badly about a woman who works; we asked men what fraction of people 
would think a husband is a bad provider if his wife worked.10 Average perceived costs are 
non-trivial and higher for men: while women anticipated social sanctions from 39 percent of 
their neighbors, men anticipated social sanctions from 56 percent of their neighbors. Given 
the substantial role that men play in deciding whether their wives work, perceived norms 
among men are likely to be important in this setting. 
2.3 Experimental Design 
At the outset of our study, MP was in the midst of a state-wide push to ensure that all 
citizens had access to a “last-mile” bank customer service point (CSP). In our study areas, 
bank accounts could only be accessed at a CSP with an authenticated fngerprint. 
While the banking drive coupled with the national directive to transition MGNREGS to 
10To simplify the question for respondents, the survey asked them to report a number out of 10. We then 
convert this number to a fraction. Throughout, we limit attention to control group communities with at 
least 20 male and female surveys. 
6 
individual direct deposits theoretically enabled women to have MGNREGS wages directly 
deposited into private, easy-to-access, secure accounts, oÿcials were slow to target women. 
Thus, when we started the study in November 2013, we had wide scope to experimentally 
vary women’s access to individual bank accounts and whether those accounts were set up to 
receive direct deposits of MGNREGS wages. In our setting, enabling direct deposit facilities 
meant replacing the previous account number attached to a worker’s name in the MGNREGS 
system with a new account number. 
A. Sample 
We purposely chose a cluster of four northern MP districts marked by severe gender in-
equities: sex ratios in these districts range from 0.84 to 0.90 females to every male (India 
Census, 2011) and, according to the 2015-2016 Indian DHS survey, just 36 percent of women 
report being able to travel outside the village alone (compared to a national average of 48 
percent).11 Appendix Figure B1 provides a timeline of experimental activities. First, we 
identifed all GPs with functional CSPs in the study districts. We randomly assigned these 
199 GPs to one of three groups: 66 GPs formed the control group, 68 GPs were to receive 
bank accounts for eligible women, and 65 GPs were to receive bank accounts and direct 
deposit of MGNREGS wage into their new accounts.12 
Between November 2013 and January 2014, we conducted a baseline census of 14,088 
households listed as having worked for MGNREGS in the past year. A married couple was 
eligible if at least one household member reported having ever worked for MGNREGS and 
the wife did not have an individual bank account.13 We identifed 5,851 eligible couples and 
two GPs without any eligible couples. These two GPs (both assigned to the control group) 
were dropped from our sample, leaving us with 197 GPs. 
B. Treatments 
Bank Accounts. We individually informed eligible women in treatment GPs that they 
could open a bank account at their local CSP, free of charge, during an upcoming account 
opening drive. On the day of the drive, our team returned to the household to inform the 
11In drawing the sample frame, we frst ranked districts by their sex ratio and literacy gender gap, and 
then chose the poorly performing districts of Gwalior, Morena, Sheopur, and Shivpuri. 
12GP randomization was stratifed by whether, at baseline, the GP had: below/above median number of 
households with joint bank accounts linked to MGNREGS direct deposit, below/above median percentage 
of individual MGNREGS accounts, and whether the GP was located in Sheopur district. All randomization 
was done by computer, in Stata. 
13More specifcally, since our baseline census sample was drawn from MGNREGS administrative records, 
eligibility required positive MGNREGS work history both according to programmatic administrative data 
and the household’s census report. 
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woman that she could visit the CSP with her documents (proof of address and a passport-
sized photo) to open an account. The study team subsequently facilitated the account 
opening process at the CSP. 
Direct Deposit. In the 65 GPs selected to receive the direct deposit treatment, our team 
submitted a request to enter each woman’s newly-opened individual bank account into the 
MGNREGS administrative system–meaning her wages would be directed into her new ac-
count rather than a household account. Women provided consent to initiate this process and 
were informed of its implications.14 
Accounts Training. Reserve Bank of India regulatory guidelines required banks to con-
duct new customer information sessions designed to build trust in formal banking services 
and explain how to utilize CSP services, including depositing and withdrawing money and 
receiving government benefts (RBI, 2016). However, these sessions were rarely conducted, 
and our early qualitative work found that many women had a poor understanding of how 
to use their new accounts. We therefore supplemented our design with a customer training 
session inspired by the Reserve Bank of India curriculum. 
In GPs selected for training, following the bank account opening camps, eligible women 
were invited to participate in a group-based information session about the local CSP and their 
bank account. The meetings typically lasted two hours. During the sessions, a facilitator 
used colored fashcards to tell the story of a fctional woman and her family and how she came 
to use a CSP account. The aim was to orient women to their local kiosk and provide basic 
information such as what an account could be used for (including saving and receiving beneft 
transfers) and why money was safe when kept at the CSP. The sessions also emphasized the 
time and cost savings of transacting at the CSP. 
The training was randomized as a third, cross-cutting treatment in half the GPs selected 
for bank accounts or bank accounts and direct deposit. This created four treatment arms: 
accounts only, accounts and direct deposit, accounts and training, and accounts, direct 
deposit, and training. 
By the end of 2014, all account openings and training sessions had been completed, 
but most women had not received account numbers and banking cards, and a number of 
accounts were awaiting direct deposit authorization.15 We therefore conducted a second 
14Although women could, in theory, sign up for direct deposit on their own, in practice this was diÿcult 
because it required a trip to the block oÿce (the administrative unit below the district) and fling a formal 
request. GP-level government oÿcials also had the power to connect accounts to direct deposit on villagers’ 
behalf, but limited incentives to do so. 
15These issues refected multiple factors, including overloaded and slow bank servers, poor connectivity 
in study areas that delayed uploading of applicant details to bank servers, and the complexity of the setup 
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round of account opening and direct deposit drives between November 2014 and April 2015. 
During these drives we brought eligible women to the CSP kiosk, gave them their account 
numbers and bank cards, and conducted a practical demonstration of how to deposit and 
withdraw money from their account.16 Women with direct deposit were again informed that 
any future MGNREGS wages would be paid into their CSP account. 
C. Intervention Catch-Up 
Our study period overlapped with national changes to fnancial inclusion policies. First, in 
August 2014, after our treatments had been implemented, the federal government announced 
a fnancial inclusion campaign, known as Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY). By 
December 2017 over 300 million bank accounts (27 million in Madhya Pradesh) had been 
opened.17 By the time of our 2017 follow-up survey, 63 percent of women in the control group 
– all of whom were unbanked in 2013 – had a bank account. Since PMJDY targeted the 
unbanked, this complicates any comparison across control and treatment groups: treatment 
women were more likely to have an account, but were less likely to have PMJDY accounts. 
Hence, we drop the control group from our main analysis, and focus on the e˙ects of direct 
deposit and training relative to accounts only. That is, we estimate the e˙ect of increasing 
women’s fnancial control while holding (initial) ownership of fnancial instruments constant. 
Second, while the levels remain low, the share of women with an individual account and 
direct deposit facilities increased steadily over our study period (recall Appendix Figure B3). 
Thus, there is a risk that direct deposit treatment e˙ects are attenuated over time due to 
changes in the frst stage. 
D. Data and Randomization Balance Check 
We use fve data sources to evaluate the impact of our interventions on women’s economic 
activity. The frst is our baseline census, which collected information on bank account 
ownership and MGNREGS participation. The need to rapidly screen a large number of 
households meant that the census did not collect detailed demographic or labor force data. 
The next two sources of data are the short-run and long-run follow-up surveys. The short-
run survey was conducted between August and December 2015–roughly one year after the 
process, which required coordination by actors at multiple administrative layers. 
16Each woman was given INR 50 to attend the camp. She was given the opportunity to deposit and 
withdraw some amount of this money to gain hands-on experience with banking at the CSP kiosk. 
17https://data.gov.in/resources/stateut-wise-number-pmjdy-accounts-20122017-ministry-fnance. Ac-
cessed May 28, 2019. Under PMJDY, banks were required to o˙er low-cost accounts with standardized 
benefts, including access to a debit card, accident and life insurance, and an overdraft facility. Overall, 
these PMJDY accounts featured more benefts than the no-frills accounts opened in our intervention. 
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frst wave of account openings was completed. We randomly selected 4,500 eligible women 
and their husbands who could still be matched to the MGNREGS system to be surveyed, 
stratifying by GP. The surveys included modules on bank account ownership and banking 
activities, participation in MGNREGS, and private-sector labor force participation. The 
female survey collected additional data on proxies of female empowerment such as decision-
making and mobility, and data on mental health and violence against women. 
We conducted a long-run survey between April and October 2017, three years after the 
frst wave of account opening. The short- and long-run surveys covered similar topics, though 
we shortened the banking modules in the latter to undertake new data collection on norms 
governing female work. Attrition for both survey waves was low: we interviewed 93 percent 
of sampled women during the frst follow-up and 92 percent of sampled women during the 
second follow-up. There is no di˙erential attrition by treatment arm (Appendix Table B1). 
Our fnal two sources of data are administrative. Banking data for accounts opened under 
the auspices of the experiment are only available from one of our two banking partners, but 
this banking partner serves 81 percent of our sample.18 The data run from the date of 
account opening up until April 30, 2018 and include a record of every transaction posted to 
1,603 female-owned accounts. Administrative data on MGNREGS work activities from the 
program management information system (MIS) are available through November 17, 2017. 
These data include information on when an individual worked, how much s/he was paid, 
and what account the wages were deposited into. We assume a woman was paid into an 
individually-owned account if no one else in the household shares that account number.19 
Appendix Table B2 presents averages of predetermined individual, household, and GP-
level characteristics and tests whether averages vary by treatment status. The “accounts 
only” group is the primary reference group in column 1. On average, eligible women (Panel 
A) were 40 years old at the frst follow up and just 11 percent report that they can read and 
write. Fifty-six percent of the husbands of eligible women (Panel B) reported that they can 
read and write.20 
During the census 64 percent of women reported that they had worked for MGNREGS 
at least once before, with 16 percent of women reporting that they worked for the program 
in the past year. The administrative data suggest higher participation rates (for instance, 
52 percent of women were listed as having worked in MGNREGS administrative data in the 
18Ninety-nine percent of women interviewed consented to our use of their administrative data. 
19These data were scraped in 2016 and 2017 from the public MGNREGS website. The data structure 
capturing account numbers changed between the 2016 and 2017 scrapes. The Online Appendix – available 
here – provides additional detail on how we infer individual account ownership from available account 
number data in the two scrapes. 
20Literacy rates in our sample are lower than GP-wide averages recorded in the 2011 Indian Census (Panel 
D); this gap is especially striking for women. 
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year before the census). This di˙erence likely refects, in part, over-reporting of work on the 
part of local leaders, an important form of program leakage (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013). 
As a balance check, columns (2)-(4) report coeÿcients on dummy variables for each 
treatment package laid on top of bank accounts: “direct deposit”, “training” and “direct 
deposit and training”. Predetermined characteristics serve as outcome variables and all 
regressions control for strata and district fxed e˙ects. Column (5) presents the p-value from 
an F-test of whether the treatment group coeÿcients are jointly equal to zero. Overall, the 
randomization is well-balanced, with just two out of 28 p-values from the joint test signifcant 
at the 10 percent level or less. Balance is also good for the direct deposit and training versus 
accounts only comparison we focus on; here just one comparison is signifcant at the 10 
percent level or less. 
Framework 
Direct deposit and training worked to increase a woman’s control over her earned income: 
direct deposit ensured MGNREGS wages were sent to her own account instead of her hus-
band’s, while training gave her the skills needed to operate that account. From an intra-
household perspective, this would boost female decision making power. Specifcally, both 
direct deposit and training could increase a woman’s outside option by making her more 
fnancially self-suÿcient: given the rarity of divorce in our context, the relevant outside op-
tion would be resorting to a non-cooperative equilibrium where spouses maintain “separate 
spheres” and do not share resources (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). For example, consider a 
case where a woman wants to spend additional money on school supplies for the children. If 
her husband knows there is no way she can make the purchase on her own, he may deny her 
request. If he knows she will make the purchase anyway if they disagree, he may consent. 
With this in mind, we use a simple model of female labor supply to highlight how the 
intrahousehold e˙ects of direct deposit and training might impact two sets of outcomes. 
First, how does increasing a woman’s control over earned income impact her labor supply 
and economic empowerment? And second, how might higher female labor supply, which 
challenges traditional norms, interact with and infuence gender norms in the community? 
We discuss how alternative channels could impact these outcomes in Section 6. 
A. Model Setup 
The Outside Option: We assume the woman’s outside option is a function of the vector 
z. z could include a range of factors, such as non-labor income shares, relative wages, and 
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the strength of the woman’s social network in the village. We assume direct deposit and 
training increase elements of z by increasing fnancial control. 
Preferences: The household consists of a husband and wife. Each spouse i ∈ F, M re-
ceives utility from private consumption (ci) and leisure (li) according to the utility function 
ui (ci, li). 21 
Norms: Both spouses incur two types of norms-based utility costs if the wife works. First, 
costs associated with actual gender identity norms: these injunctive norms refect personal 
beliefs about what women should do.22 For instance, if a woman works this could violate 
gender identity norms that “the wife takes care of the household” and “the husband is the 
breadwinner” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). A working woman and her husband incur an 
actual norms cost αi ≥ 0. 
Second, when a woman works both spouses face norms costs imposed by those community 
members who disapprove of women working. Following Tankard and Paluck (2016), we 
assume that these norms costs are uncertain and may be misperceived. Let the vector α 
denote actual norms in the community. Spouse i may put di˙erent weights on the beliefs 
of di˙erent community members (e.g. by closeness in the community network, gender, or 
economic infuence). Hence, we assume i’s perceived norms cost is given by ωi 0Ei [α], where 
ωi is a vector of importance weights. When norms are misperceived, ωi 0Ei [α] 6= ωi 0α. 
The total norms cost borne by spouse i is therefore γi = αi + ωi 0Ei [α]. If individuals 
correctly perceive the actual norms of all community members, then γi = αi +ωi 0α. However, 
as Figure 1 shows, in our setting community norm costs are mispercieved and, in line with the 
data, we focus on the case where individuals overestimate community opposition to working 
women such that γi > αi + ωi 0α. 
A woman will fully internalize her own norms costs, and may also internalize some of the 
costs borne by her husband (through a household decision-making channel). 
Labor Endowment and Wages: A woman divides her time endowment of 1 between �  �  
leisure, private sector work hFP , and MGNREGS hFN . The oÿcial MGNREGS wage is 
wN , while the oÿcial wage in the private sector is wPF . To capture the seasonal nature of 
MGNREGS and private sector work, we assume a woman can provide no more than N s 
units of labor in sector s. Putting this all together, we assume that the woman solves the 
�  
i 21We assume u ci, li is twice continuously di˙erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave in both its 
arguments. The price of the consumption good is normalized to 1. 
22In the psychology literature, a norm refers to “attributes of groups that generate expectations for the 
behavior of group members” Prentice (2007). Injunctive norms refer to beliefs about what people should do, 
while descriptive norms describe what people actually do. 
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following problem in deciding whether to work: 
�   1 − µ(z)  �  
max u F 1 − hF − hPF , c F − γF + γM 1 hF + hF > 0 subject to (1) N P N 
F hF ,c µ(z) s 
c F ≤ (1 − τN (z)) wN hFN + (1 − τP (z)) wPF hPF + φF (z) 
hF s ≥ 0 
and hs
F ≤ N s 
where 1 (·) is the indicator function, µ(z) ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative weight a woman 
places on her own norms costs versus her husband’s, τs(z) ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the woman’s 
earnings in sector s that is appropriated by her husband, and φF (z) is a net transfer from 
the husband to the wife, which could be positive or negative. These parameters may depend 
on a woman’s outside option, with a higher outside option corresponding to higher µ, lower 
τs, and higher φF . We use this setup as a reduced form to nest two alternative household 
decision-making regimes: 
• Eÿcient Collective Bargaining. Assuming the household is eÿcient, the husband will 
not tax his wife’s earnings and utility will be transferred between husband and wife 
through φF (z). Appendix A shows how the outcome of a collective bargaining model, 
modifed to include norms costs, can be represented by the solution to the above 
problem with τN = τP = 0. 
• Ineÿcient Wage Taxation. If, however, the household is ineÿcient, then the husband 
may “tax” away some of his wife’s earnings. We follow (Heath and Tan, 2015) and 
assume that as a woman’s outside option increases, the tax rates on her earnings may 
decline. To isolate this channel, we assume that under this regime a woman’s outside 
option has no impact on φF and µ = 1 (absent cooperation, the woman does not 
account for her husband’s norms costs). 
In deciding whether to work, a woman will compare her utility when she pays the norms 
costs and chooses the optimal amount of labor in each sector to her utility when she does not 
work and avoids all norms costs. She will always frst choose to work in the higher-paying 
sector and only work in the other sector if the hours constraint in the higher-paying sector 
is binding. 
Our framework highlights two key channels through which direct deposit and training 
might alter labor supply. We reference bargaining power when discussing outside option 
shifts under the (eÿcient) collective regime, and autonomy when discussing outside option 
shifts under the wage taxation regime: 
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Channel 1–Greater Bargaining Power: In the collective model, an increase in a woman’s 
outside option raises the weight placed on her (relative to her husband’s) preferences, i.e. 
increases µ. Increasing her bargaining power also increases the share of non-labor income 
she receives (φF ). 
Channel 2–Lower Wage Taxation: In non-cooperative households, the intervention could 
reduce wage taxation. Here there are two possibilities. The frst is that only the tax rate on 
MGNREGS wages (τN ) declines (e.g. if the household uses rules of thumb like “I control all 
money that is deposited into my bank account”). A second possibility is that both τP and 
τN decline (e.g. if an increase in autonomy leads to reduced wage taxation regardless of how 
a woman is paid). 
Note that our intervention focused on fnancial inclusion and did not provide women 
information about either prevalent or appropriate norms around women’s work. That said, 
being a government program it had some potential moral weight and may have implicitly 
promoted the notion that it is appropriate for women to work for MGNREGS and make 
banking transactions. However, given the intervention’s focus and its light-touch nature, we 
believe direct e˙ects of the intervention itself on γi were unlikely. 
B. How Will Women’s Labor Supply Change? 
First, consider channel 1, an increase in bargaining power (and, therefore, µ). This would 
reduce the weight that women place on norms costs borne by their husbands, which would 
draw some non-working women into the labor market–specifcally women who were not 
working due to the preferences of their husbands. At the same time, greater bargaining �  
power will increase the transfer from husband to wife φF . This would have an income 
e˙ect, and work to reduce female labor supply. 
Next consider channel 2, a reduction in wage taxation. A higher e˙ective female wage 
creates both an income and a substitution e˙ect, hence impacts on labor supply are ambigu-
ous. However, if the reduction in wage taxation were specifc to MGNREGS wages, then 
work for MGNREGS would likely increase, while work for the private sector would decrease. 
It follows that predicted impacts for women who were already working are ambiguous. 
We can, however, formulate a clear prediction for women who were not working prior to 
intervention, and therefore will only be moved by channels that make work more attractive: 
Labor Supply Prediction (1) Direct deposit and training can draw non-working women 
into the labor force through either an increase in bargaining power or a reduction in 
wage taxation. 
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The framework o˙ers guidance for distinguishing between channels: if the intervention 
broadly shifted female outside options (higher bargaining power/an increase in autonomy 
that reduces τN and τP ), we would expect to see positive downstream impacts on women’s 
empowerment and agency, as well as an increase in both public and private sector work 
among non-working women. If the intervention only increased the returns to MGNREGS, 
work for the program should increase at the expense of private sector work. 
C. How Will Norms Change? 
Over time, extensive margin impacts on labor supply could be amplifed if norms costs 
fall. Understanding the longer-run normative impacts of direct deposit and training, and 
how impacts vary by gender, is also important for building our understanding of how social 
policies can shape norms and for assessing welfare. If, for example, the interventions only 
operated through a bargaining power channel then this would imply a transfer of utility 
from men to women. If, instead, norms and their associated social costs are malleable, then 
our interventions could create a long-lasting Pareto improvement within the household– 
particularly if norms costs borne by both genders are reduced. 
Multiple experiences – including that of working, having one’s spouse work, or seeing 
more women working in one’s community – could shift actual and/or perceived norms. First, 
consider actual norms, or αi in our model. For a woman, the act of working can alter the 
gender identity norms she internalizes. For example, she may begin to take pride in bringing 
in earned income or realize that her children do not su˙er when she works. More broadly, she 
may endogenously update her personal values to align with her new behavior or “identity”. 
Since men do not necessarily need to adopt new behaviors when their wives start working, 
we anticipate larger declines in the actual norm cost of αi for women than men. Further, 
while new attitudes could spill over onto non-complier women through social learning (Fogli 
and Veldkamp, 2011; Fernandez, 2013), we anticipate these changes to be largest for women 
who alter their labor supply behavior in response to the intervention. We summarize this 
as: 
Norms Hypothesis (1) Direct deposit and training can engender a shift to more progres-
sive actual norms about women’s work, particularly among women drawn into the labor 
force. 
Next, consider perceived norms, with the associated social cost of ωi 0Ei [α]. Changes in 
perceived norms could occur if individuals update their beliefs about others’ actual norms 
either directly (by communicating with others) or indirectly (by observing women working 
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and the type of community sanctions incurred). Perceived norms may be particularly prone 
to change if they are misaligned with actual norms. Here we anticipate larger changes among 
individuals who believe norms are more conservative than they actually are (Bursztyn et al., 
2018). Figure 1 Panel B shows that a signifcant fraction of the male and female popula-
tions misperceive the actual social cost of women working, with misalignment particularly 
pronounced for men. Our fnal hypothesis is therefore: 
Norms Hypothesis (2) If there is social learning, direct deposit and training can cause 
perceived norms to liberalize. Changes should be larger among groups who, as a baseline, 
misperceive actual norms as more restrictive than they are. 
Comparing gender-specifc changes in actual and perceived norms can provide suggestive 
evidence on channels of infuence. For instance, if women, but not men, change actual norms 
then it is likely that the act of working is an important channel for updating gender norms 
related to women’s work. Shifts in perceived norms provide evidence of social learning; if 
these shifts are larger among groups with larger misperceptions (e.g. men), it suggests scope 
for misperceptions to correct when there is a shift in equilibrium female labor supply. 
D. Summary 
Our discussion identifed several points of guidance for the empirical analysis. First, labor 
supply impacts are most likely to be observed among women least attached to the labor 
market. Second, examining impacts on private versus public sector work, and on women’s 
empowerment, can help di˙erentiate between channels. Third, norms costs–and direct de-
posit and training’s e˙ects on these costs–may di˙er by gender. Separately studying e˙ects 
on actual norms, perceived norms, and gender-specifc variation e˙ects can provide suggestive 
evidence on the factors that infuence norms evolution. 
3.1 Empirical Strategy 
Our main analysis uses the following regression specifcation: 
yig = γ0 + γ1traing + γ2depositg + γ3deposit × traing + µs + λd + x 0 igδ + εig (2) 
Where yig is the outcome of interest for individual i in GP g, depositg indicates that GP g 
was randomly selected to receive direct deposit, and traing indicates selection for training. 
All regressions include controls for strata fxed e˙ects (µs) and district fxed e˙ects (λd). The 
vector xig contains controls selected using Double LASSO from all variables listed in Table 
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B2 (Belloni et al., 2014). In the Online Data Appendix, we present the full list of controls 
and indicate the subset selected by Double LASSO for each regression in the main tables. 
The error term (εig) is clustered at the GP level. 
We focus on the impact of direct deposit and training, given by θ = γ1 +γ2 +γ3. Appendix 
Tables B3-B6 report the coeÿcients on γ1, γ2, and γ3 for the main outcome variables. The 
results suggest that both interventions mattered; however, we are under-powered to identify 
the separate e˙ects of direct deposit, training, and the complementarity between the two. 
Guided by our framework, we report average intent to treat e˙ects and also e˙ects by 
baseline labor market status. Here, we split the sample based on our best-available base-
line measure of a woman’s work history: her report of whether she ever worked for MGN-
REGS.23 In Table 1 we present data from the long-run survey for the control group to show 
that this variable captures important di˙erences in broader female labor force participation 
and–consistent with our conceptual framework–men’s attitudes towards female work. We 
therefore refer to women with no baseline MGNREGS experience as “socially constrained” 
because we conjecture that they face higher normative barriers to work. 
Baseline non-workers (the socially constrained) were 10 percentage points less likely to 
have worked for pay in the past year and earned 22 percent less in the past month as 
compared to unconstrained women. Consistent with this, the constrained scored 0.20 and 
0.08 standard deviation units lower on indices of private sector and MGNREGS work, which 
measure activity along both the intensive and extensive margin. Constrained women also 
scored 0.09 standard deviations lower on our empowerment index, which captures economic 
activity, self-reported decision making power, and mobility. While we observe no signifcant 
cross-group di˙erences in women’s actual and perceived norms, husbands of constrained 
women reported signifcantly more conservative perceived norms: they believed that their 
communities were less accepting of both working women and working women’s husbands. 
Interestingly, there was no signifcant di˙erence in actual norms between the two groups: 
this suggests that misperceptions may be greater among husbands of socially constrained 
women. 
Next, we use 2016 Indian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data to create a broad 
measure of caste-based gender norms and test whether socially constrained women belong 
to castes with more restrictive gender norms. Since the DHS does not directly ask about 
injunctive FLFP norms, we focus on descriptive norms (how much women in di˙erent caste 
groups work). Using measures of women’s labor force participation we construct a stan-
dardized “DHS work norms” index, which varies at the subcaste level.24 As with other work 
23Appendix Tables B7 and B8 verify balance among the two subsamples. 
24We limit the DHS women’s sample to the Northern “Hindi Belt” states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 
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indices, higher values indicate higher FLFP. Table 1 shows that socially constrained women 
belonged to subcastes with lower FLFP. This fnding holds even after an adjustment for 
di˙erences in female education and household wealth. 
Of course, constrained and unconstrained women also di˙er on other dimensions: the 
constrained are younger, better educated, and less likely to have a bank account. Consistent 
with the fact that constrained women are less likely to work, their households have lower 
incomes even though there is no di˙erence in their husbands’ earnings. 
4 Impacts on Women’s Economic and Social Lives 
4.1 Women’s Control of MGNREGS Wages 
Our treatments had high levels of take-up. In non-control GPs we opened accounts for 
74 percent of all eligible women; in training GPs 75 percent of eligible women attended 
the training; and in direct deposit GPs, we successfully enrolled 82 percent of new account 
holders in direct deposit. We fnd no signifcant di˙erences in account opening rates across 
treatment arms, which is to be expected given that women were not informed about direct 
deposit or training until after the account opening decision was made. 
Bank administrative data confrm that the provision of direct deposit facilities altered 
MGNREGS wage payment patterns. Panel A of Figure 2 graphs the share of women ever 
receiving an MGNREGS deposit in an individual account opened during the enrollment 
camp. This refects a combination of receiving direct deposit and working for the program. 
Panel B reports the cumulative value of MGNREGS deposits sent to project accounts.25 
While direct deposit clearly increased the likelihood of women receiving MGNREGS 
wages, the e˙ect is much larger when combined with training. These impacts are persistent, 
large, and meaningful. By the time of the three-year follow-up survey, the average woman in 
direct deposit and training had received roughly INR 3,000 in MGNREGS wage payments 
in her individual account. Conditional on receiving at least one deposit, the average total 
wage payment was just over INR 7,000 ($108 at the 2017 exchange rate of INR 65 per $US). 
This amounts to 152 percent of total annual wage earnings for the same group, measured 
Bihar, Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Jharkhand. For this sample, we standardize a series of FLFP indicators and 
then calculate means by subcaste, adjusting the caste-specifc means to account for variation in sample size 
by calculating empirical Bayes’ estimates. We also construct a version of the index where FLFP indicators 
are frst regressed on dummies for female educational attainment, husband’s educational attainment, and the 
DHS wealth index. We standardize residuals from these regressions and then calculate adjusted means in an 
e˙ort to purge the FLFP index of variation driven by socioeconomic status. We merge this subcaste-based 
measure onto our own survey data. 
25We cannot directly identify MGNREGS deposits in the administrative data–instead we defne a deposit 
to be an MGNREGS deposit if it is a multiple of the MGNREGS daily wage. 
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at the year three follow up. Given the magnitude of these payments, it is plausible that the 
intervention could have shifted women’s bargaining position in the household. 
Appendix Table B10 shows treatment e˙ects on the outcomes in Figure 2 in a regression 
framework. The direct e˙ects–particularly when combined with training–are substantial 
and signifcant. The bank data have two limitations, however: frst, they may not detect 
all individual payments for women with multiple accounts. Second, they do not cover the 
19 percent of the sample served by our second banking partner. We, therefore, also use 
MGNREGS MIS administrative data to calculate individual wage payments up through 
November 30, 2017. A comparison of these results to those that leverage the bank account 
data through the same time period are very similar, though point estimates on total wage 
payments are smaller in the MIS data. 
Given evidence that our treatments altered women’s control over their earnings, we now 
examine impacts on broader measures of fnancial inclusion, labor supply, empowerment, 
and norms. To alleviate concerns about multiple testing, we follow Kling et al. (2007) and 
divide outcomes into families and then aggregate within family into a standardized index. 
Appendix Tables C1-C9 present impacts on index components. 
4.2 Women’s Financial Inclusion 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present impacts on a female bank account use index, which 
aggregates survey-based measures of individual account ownership, account use in the past 
six months, and balances. Direct deposit and training led to a 0.13 standard deviation units 
increase in this index in both the short- and long-run (Panel A). A time series of bank 
administrative data shows that average daily balances grew over time, with a persistent gap 
between accounts only and direct deposit and training (Appendix Figure B2). 
Do these impacts also refect meaningful changes in agency? Table 2, column 3, reports 
results for a banking autonomy index, which aggregates survey data on whether the respon-
dent visits the bank alone or without male supervision and is comfortable doing so. It also 
includes a measure of whether the respondent thinks women can visit the CSP without a 
male relative’s supervision. Overall, direct deposit and training signifcantly increased female 
banking autonomy by 0.19 standard deviation units. In column (4) we fnd a positive, but 
not signifcant, overall increase in the CSP knowledge index, which measures whether women 
have ever heard of the CSP and what types of transactions they know about. Panels B and 
C show results for the subset of socially constrained women (those who had not worked for 
MGNREGS at baseline) and unconstrained women (those who had worked). All impacts are 
signifcant and larger for constrained women. We formally reject equality of treatment e˙ects 
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for the constrained and unconstrained for all outcomes except short-run account use. These 
larger e˙ect sizes are notable, as constrained women’s outcomes lag those of unconstrained 
women in accounts only. In fact, direct deposit and training completely closes these gaps in 
account use, banking autonomy, and CSP knowledge. 
Against this background, we now examine how the treatments impacted women’s partic-
ipation in the labor market. 
4.3 Women’s Labor Market Engagement 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 consider an overall standardized index of labor supply in the 
short-run and long-run, respectively. This index is the average of subindices for MGNREGS, 
the private sector, and general labor supply that is not di˙erentiated by sector of work.26 
Column (1), Panel A shows that in the full sample direct deposit and training signifcantly 
increased labor supply by 0.16 standard deviation units in the short run. The results for 
MGNREGS and private labor supply sub-indices in columns (3) and (5) show that the 
aggregate e˙ect is driven by both more work for MGNREGS (a 0.19 standard deviation unit 
increase) and in the private sector (a 0.17 standard deviation unit increase). Columns (2), 
(4) and (6) show that these aggregate impacts attenuate in the long run and are no longer 
statistically signifcant. 
In Panel B, we consider the sub-sample of socially constrained women. The intervention 
increased labor supply for constrained women by 0.21 standard deviation units in the short 
run (column 1) and this increase persisted in the longer run (column 2). Strikingly, the 
long-run e˙ects for constrained women are entirely driven by the private sector.27 We reject 
equality of treatment e˙ects for constrained and unconstrained women in the long run for 
both overall labor supply and the private sector subindex. 
In contrast, the intervention boosted unconstrained women’s labor supply in the short 
run, but not the long run (Panel C). Why do e˙ects persist only for constrained women? 
26The MGNREGS sub-index includes (i) MIS-based short-term (past month) and longer-term (past 12 
months) work indicators as well as wages earned over those periods and (ii) work indicators for the same 
time periods based on self-reported survey data. The private sector sub-index includes an indicator for work, 
total earnings in the past year and a dummy for whether the woman’s occupation/main status is a worker. 
The general labor supply sub-index includes an indicator for work in the past month, earnings in the past 
month, and total months worked over the past year. It includes survey questions which did not di˙erentiate 
whether work was for MGNREGS or the private sector We include earnings as a proxy of intensive margin 
labor supply, since we fnd no signifcant impacts on market wages (see Appendix Table B17). 
27To evaluate the concern that some women mistakenly identifed MGNREGS work as private-sector 
work, we examine women’s report of payment method for each type of work. At both follow ups, less than 
1.5 percent of women reported receiving non-MGNREGS payments into a bank account, and our results are 
robust to recoding private-sector work to zero if it is paid into a bank account. Moreover, our qualitative 
feld work found that villagers clearly distinguish MGNREGS work from other types of casual work, as the 
recruitment and payment systems are very di˙erent. 
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A frst potential explanation is that ongoing (independent) government e˙orts to transition 
women to MGNREGS direct deposit enabled unconstrained women in accounts only to catch 
up to their peers in direct deposit and training. Figure 4 graphs the share of MGNREGS 
wages paid into individual accounts by quarter according to the MIS data.28 Very few women 
in accounts only gained access to direct deposit until 2017, when the MP government began 
to conduct direct deposit enrollment camps. These camps increased rates of direct deposit 
receipt–especially among unconstrained women–shortly before our long-run survey. This 
suggests that any long-run impacts we fnd on labor supply and norms may underestimate 
the benefts of direct deposit and training, especially for unconstrained women. 
A second (alternative) explanation is that, in the longer run, greater bargaining power led 
to an income e˙ect among unconstrained women and this, in turn, discouraged work. This 
is plausible: the fact that direct deposit and training increased private-sector labor supply 
suggests a broad improvement in women’s outside options, as opposed to a more narrow 
increase in the e˙ective MGNREGS wage. 
One way to distinguish between these alternative explanations is to examine impacts on 
women’s empowerment: if catch up is driven solely by an income e˙ect, then unconstrained 
women in direct deposit and training should be more empowered than their peers in accounts 
only.29 To that end, we now consider impacts on downstream outcomes, starting with proxies 
of female empowerment, to further explore these hypotheses. 
4.4 Women’s Empowerment 
In many settings, economic and social empowerment reinforce each other (Kabeer, 1999). 
An empowerment feedback loop is a critical mechanism through which increased fnancial 
control for women can translate into sustained long-term engagement with the market econ-
omy. There is, of course, no guarantee that such a feedback loop exists across all domains of 
empowerment: for example in Bangladesh, Bandiera et al. (2017) fnd that an asset trans-
fer coupled with skills training targeted to very poor women signifcantly increased female 
labor supply, fnancial inclusion, and mental health, but had no signifcant impact on deci-
sion agency. Although this could, in part, refect the inherently diÿcult task of quantifying 
household decision-making dynamics, it also underscores the importance of measuring em-
powerment across multiple dimensions of women’s lives. 
28As we can only infer direct deposit status when women work, we cannot directly measure the share of 
all sample women who are signed up for direct deposit in a given quarter. 
29Another test would be to examine time trends in labor force participation: policy catch up would 
suggest an overall upward trend in FLFP, while an income e˙ect would suggest a downward trend. However, 
there were other changes in the economic environment between the short- and long-run surveys–including 
the 2016 banknote demonitization–which makes examining time trends diÿcult. 
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Table 4 presents impacts on economic and social empowerment. To quantify impacts 
on empowerment, we create three sub-indices. The “purchase subindex” proxies women’s 
economic autonomy by aggregating a series of questions about whether she made di˙erent 
types of purchases, either at all or (in a separate set of dummy variables) with her own money 
in the past year.30 The mobility subindex aggregates a series of dummy variables indicating 
a woman visited a series of locations in the past year and in the past 30 days.31 Finally, 
the self-reported decision-making sub-index aggregates two dummy variables indicating the 
woman reported having a say in whether she works and how her own income and benefts 
payments are spent. The aggregate empowerment index (see columns 1 and 2 of Table 4) is 
a simple average of the three sub-indices. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows impacts for the whole sample. We cannot reject the null of 
no overall impact on empowerment, despite a marginally signifcant short-run impact on the 
purchases index. Panel B shows impacts for constrained women. Here, we fnd signifcant 
impacts on overall empowerment that grow in magnitude at the three-year follow up, where 
direct deposit and training increased the index by 0.14 standard deviation units relative to 
accounts only. Columns 3-8 show that results are driven by the purchases sub-index in the 
short run, and purchases and mobility in the long run. 
In contrast, we fnd no signifcant impact on any empowerment measures for uncon-
strained women, who start with higher baseline levels of empowerment. We formally reject 
equal e˙ects for constrained and unconstrained women for the purchases sub-index in the 
short and long run, as well as the aggregate empowerment index and mobility sub-index in 
the long run. Although the long-run null e˙ect for unconstrained women is consistent with 
catch up (i.e., through the government’s e˙orts to initiate individual direct deposit payments 
across the state), the null e˙ect in the short run (when unconstrained women in direct de-
posit and training were working more) is not. This could be due to power–the confdence 
interval on the short-run e˙ect for the unconstrained is [−0.05, 0.11]–or that unconstrained 
women were induced to enter the labor force for another reason, such as a shift in wage 
taxation that was not driven by a change in outside options. 
To summarize, direct deposit and training drew women into the labor market, and cat-
alyzed greater economic agency among constrained women. Appendix Table B11 shows that 
the intervention had no major implications–positive or negative–for gender-based violence 
and mental health.32 Returning to our conceptual framework, the private sector labor sup-
30Purchase categories include groceries, eating out, clothing, child health, home improvement, and festi-
vals. See the Online Appendix for additional detail. 
31The locations are the village market, the district market, her natal home, the local child care center, 
and the public health center. 
32In the longer run, we observe a modest 0.081 standard deviation unit decline in the mental health 
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ply and empowerment e˙ects suggest that the intervention increased constrained women’s 
outside options, helping them overcome their husbands’ preferences that they not work. 
5 Impacts on Gender Norms 
In our conceptual framework, we posit that if the act of working changes the gender norms 
that women (or possibly their husbands) adhere to, then actual norm costs can fall (norms 
hypothesis 1). We anticipate the largest reductions in these costs among women who were 
drawn into the labor force by the intervention. If these women overestimate norms against 
female work in the broader community, perceived norms costs should also fall (norms hypoth-
esis 2). Social learning could also lower these costs (e.g. among unconstrained households). 
As Figure 1 shows that in our setting men misperceive community norms by more, we an-
ticipate larger declines for this group. In this section we describe the data we collected on 
norms and then evaluate these hypotheses empirically. 
5.1 Data Collection and Measurement 
We conducted extensive qualitative work to inform our norms-related survey modules. Mo-
tivated by the conceptual framework, one of our key goals was to structure questions to 
capture not just beliefs about whether women should work, but also gender-specifc norms 
costs. To do this, we designed three modules. The frst covered personal preferences and was 
not gender disaggregated. Here, we asked individuals whether they believed women should 
be able to work outside the home. Then, we asked whether they wanted their sons to marry 
women who wish to work and their daughters to marry men who permitted them to work. 
Second, we developed a vignettes module, which was designed to elicit attitudes towards 
working women and their husbands, holding other household characteristics constant. The 
vignette featured two hypothetical households, composed of a husband, wife, two children, 
and paternal grandparents. Respondents were told that both families belonged to the re-
spondent’s caste and lived in the respondent’s village. The only di˙erence between the two 
families was that one wife worked for pay, while the other stayed at home. We used pictures 
to make the families salient to the respondents. Then we asked respondents to compare the 
husbands and wives in the two households. Here, we asked which woman was the better 
wife, mother, and caretaker. To capture perceived norms we asked which woman got more 
respect in the community. Then we asked which man was the better husband, provider, and 
index. However, Appendix Table B12 shows that this result is sensitive to index construction: when we code 
a “poor” mental health outcome as feeling a certain way “some of the time” or more (column 2) or “a little” 
or more, the treatment e˙ect disappears. 
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who got more community respect. The Online Appendix provides an English translation of 
the vignette module. 
The fnal module was designed to measure the intensity of perceived norms costs by 
gender. Here, we asked respondents what fraction of individuals in the community would 
speak badly of a woman who worked outside the home, and what fraction of respondents 
would think a man was a bad provider if his wife worked for pay. 
5.2 Actual Norms 
To measure actual norms, defned as average beliefs about what people “should” do (Prentice, 
2007), we frst combine the three variables from the personal preferences module into a 
standardized “personal preferences” index. Next we calculate two indices to measure the 
extent to which individuals negatively judge working women and their husbands. 
The “acceptance of working women” index aggregates vignette judgments of whether 
the working woman is the better wife, the better mother, and the better caretaker. The 
“acceptance of working women’s husbands” index aggregates vignette responses to which 
man is the better provider and the better husband. The “actual norms index” averages the 
personal preferences and acceptance indices to create a single measure of actual norms in 
our sample. In all cases, higher values correspond to greater acceptance of female work. To 
facilitate cross-gender comparison, we standardize all index components relative to women 
in the accounts only group. 
Table 5 presents results. Women’s responses are in columns (1)-(4), while men’s responses 
are in columns (5)-(8). Among women, actual norms liberalize by 0.11 standard deviation 
units, signifcant at the 1 percent level. We interpret this as a reduction, on average, in a 
woman’s actual norm costs αF . A comparison of Panels B and C shows that this e˙ect is 
driven by socially constrained women, who began with lower labor supply and more norma-
tive barriers to work. In accounts only, for example, there is a 0.14 standard deviation units 
gap between constrained and unconstrained women. Direct deposit and training completely 
closes this gap, with actual norms liberalizing by 0.22 standard deviation units among con-
strained women. Columns (2)-(4) show that point estimates on the personal preferences and 
acceptance indices are very similar. Thus, the liberalization of actual norms (or, equivalently, 
the reduction in norm costs) are concentrated in the group that exhibited sustained growth 
in labor force attachment subsequent to the intervention. This is consistent with the idea 
that the act of working reoriented constrained women’s gender identity norms. 
In contrast, columns (5)-(8) show that point estimates for men are much smaller in 
magnitude and never statistically signifcant. This could occur if men personally saw limited 
24 
gains from their wives working, or if personal behavior change (rather than spousal change) 
is needed to shift gender identity norms. Since men report slightly more progressive personal 
preferences, this works to close the actual norms gap between men and women.33 
5.3 Perceived Norms 
Here we focus on perceived norms costs by gender. First we form gender-specifc “perceived 
acceptance” indices, which standardize and aggregate the vignette question on community 
respect and the “fraction of the community who judges” question. Then we average the male 
and female indices to create an overall “perceived norms” index. Again, all index components 
are standardized relative to women in accounts only and constructed so that higher values 
correspond to fewer costs to female work. 
Table 6 presents results for perceived norms. In terms of our framework, we interpret 
more liberal perceived norms as a reduction in ωi 0Ei [α]. By comparing treatment e˙ects 
on perceived norms to those on actual norms (Table 5), we can get a sense of whether the 
misperception gap (ωi 0Ei [α] − ωi 0α) goes up, down, or remains unchanged.34 For women, 
we fnd no signifcant di˙erences on the overall perceived norms index, though perceived 
acceptance of working women is higher by 0.08 standard deviation units (signifcant at the 
5 percent level). This is similar in magnitude to the impacts on actual norms in Table 5. 
Overall, these results are consistent with either women learning about shifts in others’ views 
and/or generalizing from their own changing views regarding women’s work. 
Columns (4)-(6) show that, unlike actual norms, perceived norms liberalize among men, 
largely due to a greater acceptance of working women’s husbands. These results are meaning-
ful in magnitude, with 0.12 and 0.17 standard deviation units higher perceived acceptance 
among husbands of unconstrained and constrained women respectively. 
These impacts for men are especially notable given that men report substantially more 
restrictive perceived norms: in accounts only the perceived acceptance of husbands index 
is 0.33 standard deviation units lower among men, while the perceived acceptance of wives 
index is 0.14 standard deviation units lower. Our data also imply that men’s perceived norms 
are conservative relative to actual norms: in accounts only, men report that 57 percent of the 
community will negatively judge the husband of a working woman; yet only 33 percent of men 
report that women cannot work and in the vignettes just 48 percent of men report that the 
non-working woman’s spouse is the better husband.35 Taken together, these observations 
33While accounts only women were more likely than men to state that “women can work”, they were 
substantially less likely to prefer a daughter-in-law who works, or a son-in-law who lets his wife work. 
34When norms are perfectly perceived this is zero. 
35An important caveat here is that we cannot measure the beliefs of community members outside our 
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suggest that direct deposit and linking reduced the extent of norm misperception among 
men, which would in turn enhance the welfare of the household. 
Why might men update their perceived norms? First, a husband may directly learn 
that he had overestimated the social sanctions associated with a woman working when his 
wife starts to work. Second, seeing higher levels of FLFP in his community could help him 
indirectly learn that the social costs of work are lower than expected. Finally, men may learn 
about women’s changing attitudes (αF ) through other channels. Note that perceived norms 
liberalize among husbands of unconstrained women, whose labor supply was una˙ected in 
the long run. This suggests that social learning may have contributed to the persistent shift 
in men’s perceived norms. 
5.4 Impacts Using a Community-level Social Constraints Measure 
Our main analysis uses a self-reported measure of social constraints–whether the woman had 
ever worked for MGNREGS at baseline. Table 1 shows that this measure correlates with 
caste-based measure of working in the Indian DHS survey, as well as men’s attitudes towards 
female work in our Control Group. One concern with this measure is that it varies at the 
individual, rather than the group level. However, as Figure 1 shows, there is substantial 
cross-GP variation in norms. As an additional check, we therefore examine whether our 
main results are robust to using GP-level FLFP as recorded in the 2011 Indian Census as a 
proxy of social constraints. 
Appendix Table B9 reports demographic di˙erences between women in GPs with above 
versus below-median FLFP.36 More control group women in low-FLFP GPs are socially 
constrained, and low-FLFP GPs have lower average DHS work indices–both these patterns 
are consistent with the hypothesis that low-FLFP villages have stronger norms against female 
work. Surveyed women in low-FLFP villages also have more conservative norms. Men in 
low-FLFP villages, on the other hand, report more progressive actual norms than their peers 
in high-FLFP villages. 
Figure 5 graphs treatment e˙ects on the labor supply index, the empowerment index, 
the actual norms index (among women), and the perceived norms index (among men). We 
graph results separately for “constrained GPs” (those with below-median levels of FLFP 
according to the 2011 Census) and “unconstrained GPs” (above median FLFP). Appendix 
Tables B15 and B16 report results for the full set of outcomes. Overall, we fnd remarkably 
similar patterns using this alternative constraint measure: in constrained GPs we observe 
sizable and signifcant long-run treatment e˙ects on labor supply and norms, while short-run 
sample, e.g. village elites whose households do not work for MGNREGS. 
36Appendix Tables B13 and B14 show balance by this cut. 
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impacts on labor supply fade out in unconstrained GPs. While the two constraint measures 
are correlated (as expected), this result is not mechanical: only 49 percent of women in 
constrained GPs had never worked for MGNREGS at baseline, while 26 percent of women 
in unconstrained GPs had no experience with the program. 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Direct deposit facilities for women’s MGNREGS wage payments, coupled with basic bank 
account training, had substantial impacts on women’s work. Impacts for constrained women 
are persistent, while impacts for unconstrained women dissipate in the longer run. We fnd 
suggestive evidence that the dissipation of e˙ects for the latter group is related to the Indian 
government’s independent e˙orts to scale up fnancial inclusion for women in the period 
between our short-run and long-run survey. 
Further, long-run labor supply e˙ects are concentrated in the private sector, which sug-
gests that the intervention did not simply make work for MGNREGS more attractive. 
Rather, the results suggest that the intervention worked by increasing women’s outside 
options, thereby boosting women’s bargaining power and/or autonomy within the house-
hold. The intervention also had broader implications for women’s lives: frst, it signifcantly 
empowered constrained women. Second, treated women state more progressive attitudes 
about women in the labor force, while their husbands report lower perceived social costs 
from having a wife who works. 
While our fndings are in line with the framework laid out in Section 3, we now briefy 
consider alternative explanations for our fndings. 
6.1 Alternative Explanations 
To rationalize an increase in both MGNREGS and private-sector work, an alternative mech-
anism would need to impact the return to both forms of work. A natural possibility would 
be if women’s increased participation in MGNREGS changed private sector wages. However, 
we fnd no impact on wages, apart from a modest decline in non-farm casual wages for men 
in the long run (Appendix Table B17). 
Another possibility is that direct deposit and training impacted labor supply by easing 
savings constraints, as in Callen et al. (forthcoming). However, accounts only women also 
received bank accounts, and our experiment did not generate immediate variation in access to 
fnancial instruments (Appendix Table C1, rows 1 and 4). The basic bank training and direct 
deposit treatments may have helped women learn about the benefts of bank accounts, which 
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could in turn stimulate a broader labor supply response. This hypothesis is not supported by 
the data, however: Appendix Figure B5, Panel A shows that the number of non-MGNREGS 
deposits in accounts only are very similar to those in direct deposit and training. 
A fnal possibility is that women faced some fxed cost to working that was independent 
of social norms. In this case, if direct deposit and training improved the return to working 
for MGNREGS, it could induce women to pay the fxed cost and enter the labor market 
more broadly. One of the most common non-norms costs women might face when entering 
the labor market is fnding child care. If this were the binding constraint, then we would 
expect women with young (especially pre-school age) children to be most impacted by our 
interventions. Appendix Figure B4 estimates e˙ects by whether or not a household has a 
child under the age of 8. Treatment e˙ects are apparent for both subgroups, which suggests 
that our results are not driven by women who face the largest child care burdens at home. 
Another potential fxed cost relates to learning about work opportunities in the private 
sector. In the private sector, landlords or labor recruiters visit households and o˙er them 
short-term work opportunities. However, recruiters target both men and women, and since 
virtually all men work, it is unlikely that women’s MGNREGS participation increased access 
to recruiters. Given these results, and the fact that one-o˙ fxed costs may be less relevant as 
MGNREGS and market work tend to take place in di˙erent seasons, we fnd no compelling 
evidence that non-norms fxed costs are driving our results. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
In recent decades, economic progress in India has translated into better-paying jobs and 
more attractive work opportunities, with wage growth in rural areas outstripping that in 
urban areas (Jacoby and Dasgupta, 2015). Yet this growth has failed to draw Indian women 
into the labor market. We argue that social norms around appropriate gender roles play an 
important role in keeping Indian women out of the labor force, but that these norms can be 
overcome by interventions that increase women’s bargaining/autonomy. 
Specifcally, we show that strengthening women’s control over MGNREGS wages through 
direct deposit and training increased women’s work both for the program and in the private 
sector labor market. These changes run counter to the prediction of a basic model of eÿcient 
household decision-making, where an increase in bargaining power (precipitated by greater 
female control over workfare wages) would reduce female labor supply. Importantly, a norms 
channel rationalizes both our main treatment e˙ects and key heterogeneity–treatment e˙ects 
are largest among the subset of socially constrained women–those who, based on a lack of 
MGNREGS work experience at baseline, are least attached to the labor market and have 
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husbands who are most opposed to female work. 
In addition to shedding light on the determinants of female labor supply in contexts 
with restrictive gender norms, our results have multiple policy implications. First, gender 
targeting can impact women’s engagement with workfare programs and the labor market at 
large. This insight is especially important for programs like MGNREGS, which explicitly aim 
to include and empower women. Second, impacts can extend beyond economic fundamentals, 
reshaping the norms that govern female work. This creates scope for interventions like ours 
to create further welfare gains by altering the nature of preferences themselves. Third, our 
long-run results can help inform intervention scale-up discussions. Between the two waves of 
our follow up survey, the Indian government began scaling up MGNREGS direct deposit to 
female-owned accounts across our study area. Di˙erent from our intervention, this scale-up 
did not involve either targeted outreach to eligible women or any additional training. It 
appears that these program features were likely relevant for the most marginalized women, 
and an important reason for why we fnd persistent e˙ects on constrained women’s labor 
supply in the long run. 
Finally, our results contribute to a growing literature on the importance of gender norms 
in mediating women’s interactions with the labor market. Most existing work focuses on 
richer countries, where gender norms are more equitable but, similar to our setting, men 
are typically more conservative than women. Against this backdrop, we see our paper as 
making two important contributions. First, policy makers interested in changing norms do 
not always need to invest in costly norms-change campaigns; in some settings, targeting 
economic incentives is enough. Importantly, policies that target incentives are often easier 
to implement as norms are often diÿcult to measure and hard to move directly. Further, 
policies that cause women to increase engagement with actors external to the household are 
likely important for norm-updating in the community. This fnding is similar to the role 
model e˙ect associated with women village leaders in India (Beaman et al., 2009). Second, 
strengthening women’s economic agency can potentially unleash broader social change, es-
pecially as more conservative men update their beliefs about the social costs of adopting 
progressive behaviors. 
Our paper also highlights some important open research questions relating to how norms 
are updated and perceived by community members. For example, while our results make 
it clear that norms shift with behavior, we cannot say whose behavior (or beliefs) are most 
infuential for changing the beliefs of others. Bringing tools from the networks literature to 
bear on these questions is a promising avenue for future work. 
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Table 1: Predictors of Being Constrained 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unconstrained 
Mean 
Constrained 
Mean 
Di˙erence 
C-U N 
Panel A: Characteristics of Women 
Age+ 40.459 37.830 -2.629∗∗∗ 1699 
(0.641) 
Years Education+ 0.471 1.113 0.643∗∗∗ 1646 
(0.153) 
Age Had First Child (Among Women With Kids at Baseline)+ 19.031 19.254 0.223 1594 
(0.178) 
Has Individual Bank Account 0.585 0.500 -0.085∗∗∗ 1620 
(0.026) 
If Worked for Pay in Last Year 0.837 0.740 -0.097∗∗∗ 1620 
(0.020) 
Earnings Last Month 871.999 680.206 -191.793∗∗∗ 1596 
(63.220) 
Private Labor Index 0.070 -0.128 -0.197∗∗∗ 1620 
(0.049) 
MGNREGS Labor Index -0.073 -0.148 -0.075∗ 1620 
(0.038) 
Empowerment Index 0.071 -0.022 -0.093∗∗∗ 1610 
(0.027) 
Actual Norms Index -0.074 -0.089 -0.016 1620 
(0.032) 
Perceived Norms Index: Acceptance Working Women -0.026 -0.087 -0.062 1618 
(0.044) 
Perceived Norms Index: Acceptance Husbands -0.039 -0.086 -0.047 1618 
(0.039) 
Panel B: Characteristics of Husbands 
Age+ 44.962 42.813 -2.149∗∗∗ 1655 
(0.792) 
Years Education+ 3.266 4.996 1.730∗∗∗ 1649 
(0.260) 
Has Individual Bank Account 0.837 0.820 -0.017 1490 
(0.021) 
If Worked for Pay in Last Year 0.990 0.994 0.004 1490 
(0.004) 
Earnings Last Month 1438.257 1508.418 70.160 1472 
(138.827) 
Private Labor Index 0.612 0.680 0.067∗∗ 1490 
(0.031) 
MGNREGS Labor Index 0.177 0.054 -0.123∗ 1490 
(0.063) 
Actual Norms Index 0.030 -0.000 -0.031 1490 
(0.032) 
Perceived Norms Index: Acceptance Working Women -0.085 -0.209 -0.123∗∗∗ 1490 
(0.042) 
Perceived Norms Index: Acceptance Husbands -0.283 -0.423 -0.141∗∗∗ 1490 
(0.046) 
Panel C: Household Characteristics 
Other Backwards Caste+ 0.496 0.507 0.012 1575 
(0.053) 
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe+ 0.458 0.403 -0.054 1575 
(0.054) 
Household Income Last Month (Male Report) 5345.488 4637.625 -707.863∗∗ 1487 
(342.178) 
DHS Work Index (Residualized)† 0.026 -0.018 -0.044∗∗ 1489 
(0.019) 
DHS Work Index (Unresidualized)† 0.045 -0.016 -0.061∗∗∗ 1489 
(0.022) 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. Sample limited to control group. The mean of the constrained 
indicator for this sample is 0.336. +Outcomes are from short run survey; otherwise, outcomes are from long run survey. Data 
from short run survey, such as age, are left as their original values. †Index constructed using the Indian Demographic and 
Health Survey V (2005-2006) and merged onto our sample at the subcaste level. The residualized index residualizes out female 
education, husband education, and the DHS wealth index within the DHS data. See Online Data Appendix for more details. 
Variables measured in INR topcoded at the 99th percentile. The exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 
and INR 65 per USD in 2017. The frst two columns show the means among unconstrained and constrained women. The third 
column shows the regression coeÿcient on an indicator variable for being constrained. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. 
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Table 2: Impact of Treatments on Bank Account Use 
Account 
Use Index 
Banking 
Autonomy 
Index 
CSP 
Knowledge 
Index 
Panel A: Full sample 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 
Short-Run 
(1) 
0.131∗ 
(0.071) 
Long-Run 
(2) 
0.130∗∗ 
(0.054) 
Long-Run 
(3) 
0.190∗∗∗ 
(0.073) 
Long-Run 
(4) 
0.145 
(0.105) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.000 
2504 
-0.000 
2464 
-0.000 
2464 
0.000 
2464 
Panel B: Constrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.207∗∗ 
(0.101) 
0.265∗∗∗ 
(0.083) 
0.266∗∗∗ 
(0.086) 
0.307∗∗ 
(0.139) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.060 
922 
-0.097 
903 
-0.109 
903 
-0.068 
903 
Panel C: Unconstrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.102 
(0.080) 
0.047 
(0.058) 
0.092 
(0.078) 
0.041 
(0.098) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.027 
1519 
0.053 
1501 
0.062 
1501 
0.047 
1501 
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ 0.307 0.017∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include 
strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The 
set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See 
Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** 
p≤ 0.10. The account use index includes: if the respondent visited the bank in the past 6 
months, the respondent’s individual account balance, and if the respondent owns an individual 
account. The banking autonomy index includes if the respondent visits the bank alone, if 
they visit the bank without the supervision of a male, if they feel comfortable conducting 
transactions at the CSP, if they feel comfortable visiting the CSP alone, and if they believe 
women can visit a CSP without male supervision. The CSP knowledge index includes: if the 
respondent has heard of a CSP before and the number of transactions ever conducted at a CSP. 
All monetary values are denominated in Indian Rupees and top-coded at the 99th percentile 
(by gender). The exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per 
USD in 2017. All index components are standardized with respect to the Accounts Only group; 
see Online Data Appendix for details on how these indices are constructed. 
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Table 3: Impact of Treatments on Women’s Labour Supply 
Aggregate 
Labor Supply 
Index 
MGNREGS 
Labor Supply 
Sub-Index 
Private 
Labor Supply 
Sub-Index 
Panel A: Full sample 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 
Short-Run 
(1) 
0.165∗∗∗ 
(0.042) 
Long-Run 
(2) 
0.045 
(0.048) 
Short-Run 
(3) 
0.186∗∗∗ 
(0.071) 
Long-Run 
(4) 
0.021 
(0.080) 
Short-Run 
(5) 
0.166∗∗∗ 
(0.050) 
Long-Run 
(6) 
0.048 
(0.062) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.000 
2504 
-0.000 
2464 
-0.000 
2504 
0.000 
2464 
0.000 
2504 
-0.000 
2464 
Panel B: Constrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.213∗∗∗ 
(0.051) 
0.193∗∗∗ 
(0.060) 
0.263∗∗ 
(0.111) 
0.069 
(0.073) 
0.226∗∗∗ 
(0.059) 
0.279∗∗∗ 
(0.097) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.122 
922 
-0.186 
903 
-0.049 
922 
-0.102 
903 
-0.163 
922 
-0.275 
903 
Panel C: Unconstrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.150∗∗∗ 
(0.052) 
-0.036 
(0.057) 
0.168∗∗ 
(0.071) 
-0.008 
(0.102) 
0.153∗∗ 
(0.071) 
-0.094 
(0.059) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.061 
1519 
0.108 
1501 
0.033 
1519 
0.067 
1501 
0.080 
1519 
0.156 
1501 
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ 0.276 0.001∗∗∗ 0.343 0.398 0.352 0.000∗∗∗ 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district 
fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual 
and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * 
p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The labor supply index is an average of the MGNREGS, private, and general labor 
sub-indices. All sub-index components are standardized with respect to the Accounts Only group. The MGNREGS 
labor supply index includes if the respondent worked in the past month and if the respondent worked in the past year 
(self-reports). It also includes variables from the administrative MIS data: if the respondent worked for MGNREGS in 
the past month, if worked for MGNREGS in past year, MGNREGS wages in past month, and MGNREGS wages in past 
year. The private labor supply index includes: if the respondent’s primary occupation was a worker in the past year, 
if the respondent worked for pay in the past year, and total earnings from private work in the past year. The general 
labor supply index includes variables that could refect either public or private work: if respondent worked for pay in the 
past month, total earnings in the past month, and total months worked in the past year. See Online Data Appendix for 
further details on variable construction. All monetary values are denominated in Indian Rupees and top-coded at the 
99th percentile (by gender). The public/private labor supply index is included in the aggregate labor supply index but 
not included in this table. 
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Table 4: Impact of Treatments on Empowerment 
Aggregate 
Empowerment Index Purchase Index 
Mobility in 
Past Year 
Self-Reported 
Decision Making 
Panel A: Full sample 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 
Short-Run 
(1) 
0.041 
(0.032) 
Long-Run 
(2) 
0.032 
(0.034) 
Short-Run 
(3) 
0.096∗ 
(0.053) 
Long-Run 
(4) 
0.039 
(0.063) 
Short-Run 
(5) 
0.037 
(0.036) 
Long-Run 
(6) 
0.053 
(0.035) 
Short-Run 
(7) 
-0.021 
(0.053) 
Long-Run 
(8) 
0.019 
(0.045) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.000 
2504 
0.002 
2453 
0.000 
2504 
0.000 
2453 
-0.000 
2504 
0.000 
2464 
0.000 
2504 
-0.000 
2464 
Panel B: Constrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.100∗∗∗ 
(0.037) 
0.144∗∗∗ 
(0.049) 
0.239∗∗∗ 
(0.067) 
0.238∗∗∗ 
(0.080) 
0.023 
(0.052) 
0.115∗∗ 
(0.056) 
0.041 
(0.064) 
0.062 
(0.078) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.028 
922 
-0.111 
897 
-0.089 
922 
-0.218 
897 
0.054 
922 
-0.042 
903 
-0.050 
922 
-0.084 
903 
Panel C: Unconstrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.026 
(0.041) 
-0.022 
(0.036) 
0.042 
(0.065) 
-0.059 
(0.069) 
0.060 
(0.044) 
-0.001 
(0.040) 
-0.030 
(0.071) 
-0.005 
(0.056) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.010 
1519 
0.055 
1496 
0.037 
1519 
0.102 
1496 
-0.031 
1519 
0.027 
1501 
0.025 
1519 
0.035 
1501 
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ 0.145 0.002∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.538 0.061∗ 0.430 0.487 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates 
are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online 
Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The aggregate empowerment index is the average 
of the purchase, mobility in past year, and self-reported decision making sub-indices (columns 3-8). All sub-index components are standardized 
with respect to the Accounts Basic group. The purchase index includes indicators for if the respondent ever makes purchases for certain activities 
and if the respondent sometimes or always uses own funds for certain activities. Activities include spending on daily food, spending on clothing 
for yourself, children’s health, spending on home improvement, spending on festivals, and food and drink outside the home. The mobility index 
includes indicators for if the respondent visited the market in the panchayat, market in the district headquarters, natal home, anganwadi, and 
primary health center in the past year and in the past 30 days. The self-reported decision making index includes indicators for if the respondent 
helps decide or decides how to spend their her earnings and whether or not to take employment. See Online Data Appendix for further details on 
variable construction. 
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Table 5: Impact of Treatments on Actual Norms 
Female Reports Male Reports 
Panel A: Full sample 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 
Actual Norms 
Index 
(1) 
0.110∗∗∗ 
(0.040) 
Personal 
Preferences 
(2) 
0.098∗∗ 
(0.044) 
Acceptance: 
Working Women 
(3) 
0.091 
(0.061) 
Acceptance: 
Husbands 
(4) 
0.087 
(0.060) 
Actual Norms 
Index 
(5) 
-0.011 
(0.043) 
Personal 
Preferences 
(6) 
-0.059 
(0.070) 
Acceptance: 
Working Women 
(7) 
0.015 
(0.051) 
Acceptance: 
Husbands 
(8) 
-0.024 
(0.057) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.000 
2464 
0.000 
2464 
0.000 
2464 
-0.000 
2464 
0.077 
2293 
0.180 
2293 
0.001 
2293 
0.049 
2293 
Panel B: Constrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.215∗∗∗ 
(0.051) 
0.160∗∗ 
(0.069) 
0.243∗∗∗ 
(0.073) 
0.210∗∗∗ 
(0.077) 
-0.036 
(0.082) 
0.012 
(0.109) 
-0.020 
(0.083) 
-0.099 
(0.103) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.095 
903 
-0.068 
903 
-0.099 
903 
-0.117 
903 
0.066 
837 
0.091 
837 
0.045 
837 
0.062 
837 
Panel C: Unconstrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.050 
(0.054) 
0.059 
(0.059) 
0.007 
(0.079) 
0.019 
(0.073) 
-0.001 
(0.043) 
-0.083 
(0.079) 
0.040 
(0.063) 
-0.007 
(0.057) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.048 
1501 
0.043 
1501 
0.048 
1501 
0.054 
1501 
0.080 
1403 
0.218 
1403 
-0.024 
1403 
0.046 
1403 
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ 0.024∗∗ 0.269 0.017∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.688 0.427 0.564 0.409 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double 
post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. 
* p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. These questions were only asked in the long run survey. The actual norms index is the average of the personal preference, acceptance of 
working women, and acceptance of husbands sub-indices (columns 2-4). All sub-index components are standardized with respect to the Accounts Only group. The personal 
preferences index includes if the respondent believes that women can work, if prefers to have a daughter-in-law who wants to work for pay, and if prefers to have a son-in-law 
who allows daughter to work for pay. The acceptance indices are derived from a series of vignette questions featuring a housewife and working woman. The acceptance of 
working women sub-index includes if the respondent believes the working woman is the better wife, if believes the working woman is the better mother, and if believes the 
working woman is the better caretaker. The acceptance of husbands index includes if the respondent believes the working woman’s husband is a better provider and if believes 
the working woman’s husband is a better husband. See Online Data Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
39 
Table 6: Impact of Treatments on Perceived Norms 
Female Reports Male Reports 
Perceived Perceived Norms: Perceived Norms: Perceived Perceived Norms: Perceived Norms: 
Panel A: Full sample 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 
Norms 
Index 
(1) 
0.062 
(0.039) 
Acceptance 
Working Women 
(2) 
0.079∗∗ 
(0.040) 
Acceptance 
Husbands 
(3) 
0.050 
(0.046) 
Norms 
Index 
(4) 
0.087∗∗ 
(0.044) 
Acceptance 
Working Women 
(5) 
0.062 
(0.053) 
Acceptance 
Husbands 
(6) 
0.113∗∗ 
(0.052) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.000 
2464 
-0.000 
2464 
0.000 
2464 
-0.236 
2292 
-0.138 
2292 
-0.334 
2292 
Panel B: Constrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.116∗ 
(0.069) 
0.096 
(0.071) 
0.152∗ 
(0.080) 
0.102 
(0.078) 
0.030 
(0.095) 
0.174∗∗ 
(0.084) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.079 
903 
-0.064 
903 
-0.094 
903 
-0.310 
836 
-0.188 
836 
-0.432 
836 
Panel C: Unconstrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.007 
(0.043) 
0.052 
(0.048) 
-0.037 
(0.051) 
0.115∗∗ 
(0.046) 
0.090 
(0.063) 
0.121∗∗ 
(0.052) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.047 
1501 
0.041 
1501 
0.053 
1501 
-0.200 
1403 
-0.117 
1403 
-0.284 
1403 
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ 0.168 0.606 0.041∗∗ 0.882 0.597 0.520 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates 
are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data 
Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. These questions were only asked in the long run survey. 
The perceived norms index is the average of the perceived acceptance of working women and the perceived acceptance of working women’s husbands 
sub-indices. The perceived acceptance of working women sub-index includes the respondent’s perception of the fraction of community members who 
will not think poorly of working women and if the respondent perceives that the working woman (from the vignettes) is viewed with more respect. 
The perceived acceptance of husbands sub-index includes the respondent’s perception of the fraction of the community who will not think a working 
woman’s husband is a bad provider and if the respondent perceives that the working woman’s husband is viewed with more respect. See Online Data 
Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Village-Level Attitudes and Perceived Social Sanctions towards Female Work 
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Notes: Both panels limit the sample to 32 Control group GPs that have 20 or more non-missing observations for both male and female 
reports. Panel A plots the GP-level distribution of the share of respondents who agree with the statement “women can not go out and 
work” over “women can go out for work”. Panel B plots the average female report of the share of households who would speak badly about 
a woman if she were to go out and work (female report) and the share of households who would think a man is a bad provider if his wife 
were to go out and work. The dashed lines report the GP-level average of each variable of interest. 
Figure 2: Administrative Data - NREGA deposits in Project Accounts Over Time 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
2014m1 2015m1 2016m1 2017m1 2018m1
Date
A. Received any MGNREGS deposit in project account
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
A
m
o
u
n
t
 
(
R
p
)
2014m1 2015m1 2016m1 2017m1 2018m1
Date
B. Cumulative MGNREGS Deposits
Accounts Only Accounts + Direct Deposit
Accounts + Training Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training
41 
Notes: Administrative bank account data. All non-account openers are coded as having zero values for all measures. All outcomes are 
top-coded at the 99th percentile by month and gender. Dashed lines demarcate the beginning and end of the short-run and long-run 
surveys. The exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per USD in 2017. 
Figure 3: Treatment E˙ects on Labor Supply Sub-Indices 
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Notes: Bars display e˙ect of Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training. Whiskers show 90 and 95 percent confdence intervals, based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the GP level. See Online Data Appendix for details on index components. 
Figure 4: Share of MGNREGS Wages Paid Individually Over Time 
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Notes: This graphs the share of MGNREGS payments made to sampled women in individual 
accounts according to MGNREGS MIS data. A small number of payments cannot be classifed as 
individual or joint; these are dropped from all estimates. Shaded bars indicate follow-up survey 
periods. 
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Figure 5: Treatment E˙ects by Above/Below Median GP-Level FLFP 
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Notes: In this fgure, an individual is considered "constrained" if they reside in a GP with a 
female labor force participation rate below the median rate (among the sample GPs) according to 
the 2011 Indian Census. See Tables B15 and B16 for the full set of regressions. Whiskers give 90 
and 95 percent confdence intervals on point estimates. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the GP level. All regressions include controls for strata, district, and additional controls selected 
via double lasso. 
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A Theoretical Appendix 
In this section we show how a collective model of household bargaining with fxed norms 
costs can be represented by the reduced form presented in the main paper. 
We assume a household consists of two members (i ∈ {M, F }). Individual utility func-
tions, norms costs, wages, and hours constraints are the same as those described in the main 
text. Further, each household receives non-labor income y. Finally, we assume that the wife’s 
Pareto weight is given by µ. This weight may be a function of wages, non-labor income, and 
“distribution factors” (z), which a˙ect the bargaining weight µ, but do not otherwise enter 
the household utility maximization problem (Blundell et al., 2005). 
The household’s allocation problem is given by: 
 �  �  
max µ(z) uF 1 − hNF − hPF , cF − γF 1 hPF + hFN > 0 (3) + i
s 
i h ,c  �  �  
1 − hM − hM − γM 1 hF 
cM + cF ≤ wi hi + y 
(1 − µ(z)) uM NP P , c P M P + hFN > 0 subject to 
i=M,F s=N,P s s 
his ≥ 0 
i 
hiN ≤ N s 
Where 1 (·) is the indicator function. 
Now, assume no social constraints to female work: γF = γM = 0. In this case, the 
household problem can be represented in two stages. In the frst stage, the household im-
plements a sharing rule in which the wife receives a share of non-labor income given by �  
ΦF F F M M 37 wP , wN , wP , wN , y, z , while the husband receives share ΦM = y − ΦF . In the second 
stage, each spouse maximizes his or her own individual utility subject to the budget con-
i hi i hi straint ci ≤ w N +w +Φi and the hours constraints. Proposition 1 in Chiappori (1992) N P P 
provides a formal proof of the equivalence between these two problems – the key here is that 
preferences over consumption and leisure are separable, in that each spouse only cares about 
his/her own consumption and leisure. The frst order conditions give the familiar result that 
if an individual works in sector j (and in the case of MGNREGS the hours constraint is not 
binding), his or her marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal 
to the wage: u il 
i
l 
/u 
If γF > 0 but γM = 0, the two-stage setup still delivers the same solution as program 
3. However, in some cases a woman may be socially constrained, in that she does not work 
/u 
i i
c = w j . 
even though u i ic < w j . 
37An individual’s income share can be negative or positive – the purpose of Φi is to fx which point on 
the Pareto frontier the household ends up choosing. 
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Things look di˙erent when γM > 0, since women’s preferences over consumption and 
leisure are no longer separable from men’s. However, we can rewrite program 3 to satisfy 
− 1−µ separability. Specifcally, let the wife’s modifed utility be: uF (lF , cF ) − γF
µ γ
M . The 
husband’s modifed utility is uM (lM , cM ). The bargaining power weighted objective function 
matches that of program 3, but the utility functions are separable. 
This in turn implies that in the two stage problem, we can think of the wife behaving 
as if she maximizes uF (lF , cF ) − γF − 1− 
µ
µ γM : she internalizes the norms costs borne to 
her husband, with more weight placed on this cost the lower her relative bargaining power. 
Further, this modifed two-stage formulation corresponds to the reduced-form problem laid 
out in the main text. 
B Appendix Tables and Figures 
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Table B1: Balance on Attrition 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accounts 
Only 
Mean 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
Accounts 
+ Training 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
+ Training 
P-Value: 
Joint Test N 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Woman Interviewed at Midline 0.931 0.002 0.003 0.018 0.469 2666 
Husband Interviewed at Midline 0.869 0.022 0.011 0.030 0.507 2666 
Woman Interviewed at Endline 0.911 0.014 0.007 0.023 0.579 2666 
Husband Interviewed at Endline 0.844 0.033 0.002 0.019 0.514 2666 
Panel B: Constrained Women 
Woman Interviewed at Midline 0.916 0.016 -0.011 0.021 0.511 993 
Husband Interviewed at Midline 0.877 0.026 -0.032 0.012 0.248 993 
Woman Interviewed at Endline 0.877 0.057∗ 0.003 0.025 0.132 993 
Husband Interviewed at Endline 0.824 0.052 -0.026 -0.024 0.058∗ 993 
Panel C: Unconstrained Women 
Woman Interviewed at Midline 0.940 -0.012 0.009 0.014 0.488 1608 
Husband Interviewed at Midline 0.869 0.015 0.023 0.034 0.538 1608 
Woman Interviewed at Endline 0.930 -0.014 0.010 0.021 0.390 1608 
Husband Interviewed at Endline 0.862 0.012 -0.001 0.033 0.642 1608 
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. All regressions include district and strata fxed e˙ects. The frst column 
gives the mean among the Accounts Only group, columns 2-4 give regression coeÿcients. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the GP level are omitted from the table for legibility. Column 5 gives the p-value from a test that 
all treatment coeÿcients are jointly equal to zero. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01. Sample is the union of 
individuals in midline and endline. Husbands were only interviewed at midline if their wives were interviewed. 
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Table B2: Balance on Predetermined Demographic Characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accounts 
Only 
Mean 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
Accounts 
+ Training 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
+ Training 
P-Value: 
Joint Test N 
Panel A: Individual Characteristics of Eligible Women 
Age 40.067 -0.517 0.099 -0.926 0.540 2407 
Years Education 0.808 -0.042 -0.186 0.086 0.221 2332 
Can Read or Write 0.106 0.003 -0.018 0.009 0.418 2391 
Had No Children At Time of Baseline 0.021 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 0.875 2388 
Age Had First Child (Among Women With Kids at Baseline) 19.074 0.048 0.183 -0.258 0.187 2339 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline (Unconstrained)† 0.641 -0.015 0.005 0.009 0.923 2407 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.161 0.020 0.022 0.046 0.598 2138 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.518 -0.079 0.049 0.022 0.251 2308 
Panel B: Individual Characteristics of Husbands 
Age 44.597 0.130 -0.046 -1.106 0.462 2359 
Years Education 4.272 -0.306 -0.411 0.107 0.333 2338 
Can Read or Write 0.564 -0.062 -0.055 -0.033 0.400 2289 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline† 0.930 -0.018 -0.004 0.026∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 2407 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.317 0.020 -0.026 0.015 0.795 2070 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.652 -0.100∗ -0.029 -0.079 0.247 2149 
Panel C: Household/Couple Characteristics 
Male-Female Age Gap 4.707 0.498 -0.151 -0.306 0.055∗ 2359 
Male-Female Education Gap 3.508 -0.338 -0.200 -0.024 0.593 2269 
Hindu 0.959 0.013 -0.013 0.023 0.130 2391 
Scheduled Caste or Tribe 0.360 0.009 0.087 0.032 0.687 2276 
Other Backward Caste 0.556 -0.015 -0.057 -0.020 0.893 2276 
Number Household Members on Job Card† 3.947 -0.185 0.144 -0.022 0.651 2407 
Panel D: GP Characteristics 
Number Eligible Women in GP 25.324 7.047 4.917 2.338 0.441 133 
Total GP Population 2837.059 1228.640∗ 866.262∗ 255.411 0.169 133 
Fraction GP Population Female 0.461 0.002 -0.000 0.005 0.492 133 
Fraction GP Population SC/ST 0.274 -0.010 0.027 0.064 0.242 133 
Fraction Female GP Population Literate 0.411 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 0.974 133 
Fraction Male GP Population Literate 0.651 -0.017 -0.005 -0.014 0.742 133 
Female Workers / Female GP Population 0.277 0.004 0.019 0.040 0.571 133 
Male Workers / Male GP Population 0.511 0.004 0.013 0.007 0.474 133 
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. All regressions include district and strata fxed e˙ects. Regressions in Panel D are at the GP level with 
robust standard errors; otherwise, regressions are at the individual level with standard errors clustered at the GP level. Standard errors are omitted 
from the table for legibility. The frst column gives the mean among the Accounts Only group, columns 2-4 give regression coeÿcients. Column 5 
gives the p-value from a test that all treatment coeÿcients are jointly equal to zero. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01. Variables marked by † are 
from the baseline census, and variables marked by + are from the MIS data. All data in Panel D are from the Indian Census. Otherwise, data are 
from the short run survey. Data from the short run survey, such as age, are left as their original values. 
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Table B3: Impact of Treatments on Main Outcomes: Full Specifcation (Part 1) 
Short Run Long Run 
γ1 γ2 γ3 θ N γ1 γ2 γ3 θ N 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Table 2: Women’s Bank Use 
Account Use Index 0.127∗∗ -0.029 0.034 0.131∗ 2504 0.045 0.012 0.073 0.130∗∗ 2464 
(0.064) (0.074) (0.098) (0.048) (0.054) (0.078) 
Constrained 0.214∗ -0.017 0.011 0.207∗∗ 922 0.098 0.067 0.100 0.265∗∗∗ 903 
(0.110) (0.119) (0.152) (0.086) (0.086) (0.123) 
Unconstrained 0.094 -0.022 0.030 0.102 1519 0.032 -0.012 0.027 0.047 1501 
(0.062) (0.059) (0.097) (0.049) (0.057) (0.079) 
Banking Autonomy Index 0.134 0.012 0.044 0.190∗∗∗ 2464 
(0.085) (0.071) (0.115) 
Constrained 0.124 -0.029 0.170 0.266∗∗∗ 903 
(0.091) (0.084) (0.128) 
Unconstrained 0.099 -0.025 0.017 0.092 1501 
(0.099) (0.081) (0.129) 
CSP Knowledge Index -0.046 -0.057 0.249∗ 0.145 2464 
(0.083) (0.094) (0.135) 
Constrained 0.103 -0.075 0.280 0.307∗∗ 903 
(0.116) (0.122) (0.176) 
Unconstrained -0.119 -0.039 0.199 0.041 1501 
(0.080) (0.095) (0.135) 
Table 3: Women’s Labor Supply 0.043 0.033 0.089 0.165∗∗∗ 2504 0.039 -0.036 0.041 0.045 2464 
Aggregate Labor Supply Index (0.044) (0.040) (0.059) (0.056) (0.049) (0.074) 
0.046 0.087∗ 0.080 0.213∗∗∗ 922 0.166∗∗ 0.033 -0.006 0.193∗∗∗ 903 
Constrained (0.052) (0.047) (0.072) (0.072) (0.065) (0.094) 
0.068 -0.001 0.084 0.150∗∗∗ 1519 -0.024 -0.084 0.071 -0.036 1501 
Unconstrained (0.056) (0.056) (0.075) (0.068) (0.056) (0.086) 
0.027 -0.072 0.231∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 2504 -0.013 -0.077 0.111 0.021 2464 
MGNREGS Labor Supply Sub-Index (0.068) (0.059) (0.094) (0.125) (0.078) (0.134) 
0.061 -0.032 0.234∗ 0.263∗∗ 922 0.017 -0.033 0.085 0.069 903 
Constrained (0.106) (0.095) (0.139) (0.093) (0.070) (0.113) 
0.037 -0.103∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 1519 -0.038 -0.108 0.138 -0.008 1501 
Unconstrained (0.073) (0.061) (0.098) (0.157) (0.098) (0.162) 
0.048 0.101∗∗ 0.016 0.166∗∗∗ 2504 0.090 -0.012 -0.030 0.048 2464 
Private Labor Supply Sub-Index (0.049) (0.048) (0.070) (0.057) (0.065) (0.089) 
0.042 0.120∗ 0.063 0.226∗∗∗ 922 0.322∗∗∗ 0.103 -0.146 0.279∗∗∗ 903 
Constrained (0.062) (0.064) (0.092) (0.097) (0.101) (0.136) 
0.081 0.106 -0.034 0.153∗∗ 1519 -0.011 -0.089 0.006 -0.094 1501 
Unconstrained (0.066) (0.071) (0.093) (0.060) (0.063) (0.092) 
This table reports the main regression results. Each row lists results both in the short run (columns 1-5, when applicable) and long run 
(columns 6-10) for each main outcome variable in the full sample. Sub-rows represent results for the same outcome variable for the constrained 
and unconstrained sub-samples. γ1 represents the e˙ect of training (columns 1 and 6), γ2 the e˙ect of direct deposit (columns 2 and 7), and 
γ3 the e˙ect of both training and direct deposit (columns 3 and 8). θ is the total treatment e˙ect of direct deposit and training (columns 
4 and 9). Columns 5 and 10 report the sample size. All regressions cluster robust standard errors at the GP level and include strata and 
district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level 
characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. 
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Table B4: Impact of Treatments on Main Outcomes: Full Specifcation (Part 2) 
Short Run Long Run 
γ1 γ2 γ3 θ N γ1 γ2 γ3 θ N 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Table 4: Empowerment 
Aggregate Empowerment Index 0.003 0.011 0.027 0.041 2504 0.081∗ 0.011 -0.060 0.032 2453 
(0.036) (0.040) (0.051) (0.042) (0.030) (0.052) 
Constrained 0.069∗ 0.033 -0.003 0.100∗∗∗ 922 0.162∗∗∗ 0.042 -0.060 0.144∗∗∗ 897 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.057) (0.052) (0.041) (0.067) 
Unconstrained -0.013 0.011 0.029 0.026 1519 0.056 0.004 -0.082 -0.022 1496 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.069) (0.049) (0.035) (0.060) 
Purchase Index -0.027 0.027 0.095 0.096∗ 2504 0.134 -0.028 -0.068 0.039 2453 
(0.049) (0.062) (0.075) (0.084) (0.059) (0.101) 
Constrained 0.013 0.096 0.129 0.239∗∗∗ 922 0.220∗∗ 0.071 -0.053 0.238∗∗∗ 897 
(0.060) (0.072) (0.089) (0.086) (0.072) (0.110) 
Unconstrained -0.064 -0.037 0.143 0.042 1519 0.108 -0.075 -0.092 -0.059 1496 
(0.057) (0.069) (0.091) (0.097) (0.067) (0.117) 
Mobility in Past Year 0.046 0.014 -0.023 0.037 2504 0.047 -0.018 0.023 0.053 2464 
(0.034) (0.037) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043) (0.054) 
Constrained 0.061 -0.001 -0.038 0.023 922 0.051 -0.021 0.086 0.115∗∗ 903 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.070) (0.055) (0.056) (0.075) 
Unconstrained 0.046 0.024 -0.011 0.060 1519 0.041 -0.015 -0.027 -0.001 1501 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.055) (0.049) (0.049) (0.064) 
Self-Reported Decision Making -0.012 -0.005 -0.004 -0.021 2504 0.086∗ 0.087∗ -0.153∗∗ 0.019 2464 
(0.061) (0.057) (0.081) (0.048) (0.044) (0.069) 
Constrained 0.107 0.010 -0.076 0.041 922 0.187∗∗ 0.076 -0.200∗ 0.062 903 
(0.075) (0.056) (0.093) (0.079) (0.073) (0.105) 
Unconstrained -0.050 -0.003 0.023 -0.030 1519 0.049 0.110∗∗ -0.165∗∗ -0.005 1501 
(0.082) (0.077) (0.111) (0.060) (0.055) (0.083) 
This table reports the main regression results. Each row lists results both in the short run (columns 1-5, when applicable) and long 
run (columns 6-10) for each main outcome variable in the full sample. Sub-rows represent results for the same outcome variable for 
the constrained and unconstrained sub-samples. γ1 represents the e˙ect of training (columns 1 and 6), γ2 the e˙ect of direct deposit 
(columns 2 and 7), and γ3 the e˙ect of both training and direct deposit (columns 3 and 8). θ is the total treatment e˙ect of direct 
deposit and training (columns 4 and 9). Columns 5 and 10 report the sample size. All regressions cluster robust standard errors at the 
GP level and include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential 
controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential 
controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. 
Table B5: Impact of Treatments on Main Outcomes: Full Specifcation (Part 3) 
Long Run 
γ1 γ2 γ3 θ N 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Table 5: Actual Norms, Female Report 
Actual Norms Index 0.028 -0.010 0.093∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 2464 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.056) 
Constrained 0.064 0.030 0.121 0.215∗∗∗ 903 
(0.058) (0.057) (0.087) 
Unconstrained 0.013 -0.035 0.072 0.050 1501 
(0.050) (0.041) (0.063) 
Personal Preferences -0.014 -0.008 0.119∗ 0.098∗∗ 2464 
(0.041) (0.044) (0.066) 
Constrained 0.057 -0.031 0.135 0.160∗∗ 903 
(0.069) (0.071) (0.108) 
Unconstrained -0.063 -0.008 0.130∗ 0.059 1501 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.072) 
Acceptance: Working Women 0.028 -0.030 0.092 0.091 2464 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.077) 
Constrained 0.051 -0.004 0.196∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 903 
(0.069) (0.078) (0.109) 
Unconstrained 0.015 -0.048 0.040 0.007 1501 
(0.073) (0.064) (0.095) 
Acceptance: Husbands 0.002 -0.069 0.154 0.087 2464 
(0.083) (0.059) (0.103) 
Constrained 0.071 0.075 0.064 0.210∗∗∗ 903 
(0.092) (0.081) (0.121) 
Unconstrained -0.023 -0.150∗∗ 0.192 0.019 1501 
(0.102) (0.068) (0.122) 
Table 5: Actual Norms, Male Report 
Actual Norms Index -0.037 -0.030 0.056 -0.011 2293 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.057) 
Constrained -0.102 -0.027 0.092 -0.036 837 
(0.079) (0.083) (0.104) 
Unconstrained 0.031 -0.035 0.003 -0.001 1403 
(0.047) (0.042) (0.062) 
Personal Preferences -0.022 -0.068 0.032 -0.059 2293 
(0.076) (0.070) (0.103) 
Constrained -0.034 0.082 -0.036 0.012 837 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.137) 
Unconstrained 0.008 -0.152∗∗ 0.061 -0.083 1403 
Acceptance: Working Women -0.037 -0.013 0.065 0.015 2293 
(0.048) (0.047) (0.068) 
Constrained -0.103 -0.059 0.143 -0.020 837 
(0.088) (0.087) (0.120) 
Unconstrained -0.004 0.020 0.024 0.040 1403 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.086) 
Acceptance: Husbands -0.070 -0.070 0.116∗ -0.024 2293 
(0.052) (0.045) (0.068) 
Constrained -0.167∗ -0.103 0.171 -0.099 837 
(0.098) (0.101) (0.128) 
Unconstrained 0.002 -0.043 0.034 -0.007 1403 
(0.054) (0.052) (0.074) 
This table reports the main regression results. Each row lists results both in the long run 
for each main outcome variable in the full sample. Sub-rows represent results for the same 
outcome variable for the constrained and unconstrained sub-samples. γ1 represents the e˙ect 
of training (column 1), γ2 the e˙ect of direct deposit (column 2), and γ3 the e˙ect of both 
training and direct deposit (column 3). θ is the total treatment e˙ect of direct deposit and 
training (column 4). Column 5 report the sample size. All regressions cluster robust standard 
errors at the GP level and include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are 
selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level 
characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential 
controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. 
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Table B6: Impact of Treatments on Main Outcomes: Full Specifcation (Part 4) 
Long Run 
γ1 γ2 γ3 θ N 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Table 6: Perceived Norms, Female Report 
Perceived Norms Index 0.028 -0.032 0.066 0.062 2464 
(0.049) (0.038) (0.064) 
Constrained 0.083 -0.010 0.042 0.116∗ 903 
(0.068) (0.073) (0.097) 
Unconstrained -0.009 -0.053 0.070 0.007 1501 
(0.061) (0.040) (0.073) 
Perceived Norms: Acceptance Working Women 0.068 -0.034 0.045 0.079∗∗ 2464 
(0.047) (0.043) (0.063) 
Constrained 0.118 -0.014 -0.008 0.096 903 
(0.078) (0.079) (0.105) 
Unconstrained 0.039 -0.052 0.065 0.052 1501 
(0.057) (0.050) (0.073) 
Perceived Norms: Acceptance Husbands -0.002 -0.015 0.068 0.050 2464 
(0.057) (0.040) (0.073) 
Constrained 0.075 0.039 0.037 0.152∗ 903 
(0.071) (0.073) (0.100) 
Unconstrained -0.058 -0.054 0.074 -0.037 1501 
(0.075) (0.046) (0.090) 
Table 6: Perceived Norms, Male Report 
Perceived Norms Index 0.052 0.019 0.017 0.087∗∗ 2292 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.062) 
Constrained 0.011 0.036 0.055 0.102 836 
(0.076) (0.070) (0.099) 
Unconstrained 0.132∗∗∗ 0.049 -0.066 0.115∗∗ 1403 
(0.044) (0.047) (0.064) 
Perceived Norms: Acceptance Working Women 0.039 0.005 0.018 0.062 2292 
(0.049) (0.057) (0.078) 
Constrained -0.032 0.006 0.057 0.030 836 
(0.092) (0.084) (0.121) 
Unconstrained 0.083 0.004 0.003 0.090 1403 
(0.061) (0.066) (0.092) 
Perceived Norms: Acceptance Husbands 0.065 0.033 0.015 0.113∗∗ 2292 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.065) 
Constrained 0.054 0.066 0.053 0.174∗∗ 836 
(0.085) (0.075) (0.106) 
Unconstrained 0.147∗∗∗ 0.066 -0.092 0.121∗∗ 1403 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.070) 
This table reports the main regression results. Each row lists results both in the long run for each 
main outcome variable in the full sample. Sub-rows represent results for the same outcome variable for 
the constrained and unconstrained sub-samples. γ1 represents the e˙ect of training (column 1), γ2 the 
e˙ect of direct deposit (column 2), and γ3 the e˙ect of both training and direct deposit (column 3). 
θ is the total treatment e˙ect of direct deposit and training (column 4). Column 5 report the sample 
size. All regressions cluster robust standard errors at the GP level and include strata and district fxed 
e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes 
individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete 
list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. 
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Table B7: Balance on Predetermined Demographic Characteristics - Unconstrained Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accounts 
Only 
Mean 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
Accounts 
+ Training 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
+ Training 
P-Value: 
Joint Test N 
Panel A: Individual Characteristics of Eligible Women 
Age 41.255 -0.494 -0.413 -1.126 0.746 1472 
Years Education 0.649 -0.091 -0.097 0.093 0.484 1424 
Can Read or Write 0.080 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.998 1462 
Had No Children At Time of Baseline 0.017 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.649 1462 
Age Had First Child (Among Women With Kids at Baseline) 19.126 -0.036 0.021 -0.484∗∗ 0.085∗ 1442 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.558 -0.101 0.029 -0.050 0.403 1417 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.250 0.044 0.041 0.076 0.561 1305 
Panel B: Individual Characteristics of Husbands 
Age 45.866 0.114 -0.974 -1.255 0.358 1441 
Years Education 3.951 -0.564 -0.699∗ -0.242 0.258 1429 
Can Read or Write 0.554 -0.097∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.086∗ 0.049∗∗ 1394 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.664 -0.102∗ -0.023 -0.102∗ 0.209 1325 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline† 0.926 -0.027 0.003 0.027∗ 0.049∗∗ 1472 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.295 0.027 0.004 0.042 0.838 1314 
Panel C: Household/Couple Characteristics 
Male-Female Age Gap 4.886 0.342 -0.568 -0.349 0.147 1441 
Male-Female Education Gap 3.311 -0.542 -0.526 -0.357 0.422 1384 
Hindu 0.972 0.011 -0.026 0.007 0.403 1464 
Scheduled Caste or Tribe 0.370 0.046 0.102 0.025 0.674 1371 
Other Backward Caste 0.569 -0.040 -0.103 -0.025 0.575 1371 
Number Household Members on Job Card† 4.074 -0.358 0.082 -0.113 0.425 1472 
Panel D: GP Characteristics 
Number Eligible Women in GP 26.000 7.110 4.637 2.947 0.474 129 
Total GP Population 2883.394 1196.056∗ 811.583 254.732 0.218 129 
Fraction GP Population Female 0.463 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.542 129 
Fraction GP Population SC/ST 0.282 -0.012 0.020 0.062 0.302 129 
Fraction Female GP Population Literate 0.409 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 0.986 129 
Fraction Male GP Population Literate 0.648 -0.016 -0.005 -0.010 0.804 129 
Female Workers / Female GP Population 0.283 -0.004 0.014 0.046 0.387 129 
Male Workers / Male GP Population 0.511 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.540 129 
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. All regressions include district and strata fxed e˙ects. Regressions in Panel D are at the GP level with 
robust standard errors; otherwise, regressions are at the individual level with standard errors clustered at the GP level. Standard errors are omitted 
from the table for legibility. The frst column gives the mean among the Accounts Only group, columns 2-4 give regression coeÿcients. Column 
5 gives the p-value from a test that all treatment coeÿcients are jointly equal to zero. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01. Variables marked by 
† are from the baseline census, and variables marked by + are from the MIS data. All data in Panel D are from the Indian Census. Otherwise, 
data are from the short run survey. Data from the short run survey, such as age, are left as their original values. Sample restricted to women who 
reported having done NREGA work at baseline. 
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Table B8: Balance on Predetermined Demographic Characteristics - Constrained Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accounts 
Only 
Mean 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
Accounts 
+ Training 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
+ Training 
P-Value: 
Joint Test N 
Panel A: Individual Characteristics of Eligible Women 
Age 37.806 -0.072 1.926 -0.161 0.265 877 
Years Education 1.070 0.138 -0.301 0.152 0.321 853 
Can Read or Write 0.147 0.024 -0.045 0.041 0.122 871 
Had No Children At Time of Baseline 0.026 0.006 0.002 -0.004 0.903 870 
Age Had First Child (Among Women With Kids at Baseline) 18.978 0.227 0.546∗ 0.166 0.284 845 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.478 -0.028 0.117 0.130∗ 0.095∗ 833 
Panel B: Individual Characteristics of Husbands 
Age 42.144 0.621 2.192∗ -0.438 0.224 865 
Years Education 4.947 0.028 0.046 0.696 0.274 856 
Can Read or Write 0.587 -0.008 0.036 0.065 0.365 845 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.667 -0.087 -0.006 -0.040 0.612 772 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline† 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 877 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.359 0.008 -0.069 -0.034 0.691 756 
Panel C: Household/Couple Characteristics 
Male-Female Age Gap 4.479 0.639 0.164 -0.294 0.203 865 
Male-Female Education Gap 3.907 -0.140 0.356 0.480 0.313 835 
Hindu 0.942 0.007 0.003 0.039 0.170 870 
Scheduled Caste or Tribe 0.332 -0.051 0.059 0.036 0.462 852 
Other Backward Caste 0.543 0.037 0.020 0.009 0.974 852 
Number Household Members on Job Card† 3.691 0.098 0.277 0.120 0.889 877 
Panel D: GP Characteristics 
Number Eligible Women in GP 26.438 7.706 6.445 3.087 0.374 124 
Total GP Population 2875.813 1242.852∗ 931.687∗ 259.117 0.195 124 
Fraction GP Population Female 0.462 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.688 124 
Fraction GP Population SC/ST 0.278 -0.028 0.027 0.058 0.143 124 
Fraction Female GP Population Literate 0.413 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 0.962 124 
Fraction Male GP Population Literate 0.654 -0.026 -0.004 -0.018 0.440 124 
Female Workers / Female GP Population 0.272 0.011 0.037 0.041 0.553 124 
Male Workers / Male GP Population 0.510 0.007 0.016∗ 0.008 0.365 124 
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. All regressions include district and strata fxed e˙ects. Regressions in Panel D are at the GP level 
with robust standard errors; otherwise, regressions are at the individual level with standard errors clustered at the GP level. Standard errors are 
omitted from the table for legibility. The frst column gives the mean among the Accounts Only group, columns 2-4 give regression coeÿcients. 
Column 5 gives the p-value from a test that all treatment coeÿcients are jointly equal to zero. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01. Variables 
marked by † are from the baseline census, and variables marked by + are from the MIS data. All data in Panel D are from the Indian Census. 
Otherwise, data are from the short run survey. Data from the short run survey, such as age, are left as their original values. Sample restricted to 
women who reported not having done NREGA work at baseline. 
Table B9: Predictors of Living in a Low FLFP Village 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
High FLFP 
Mean 
Low FLFP 
Mean 
Di˙erence 
Low-High N 
Panel A: Characteristics of Women 
Age+ 39.432 39.951 0.519 1738 
(0.705) 
Years Education+ 0.683 0.692 0.009 1683 
(0.130) 
Age Had First Child (Among Women With Kids at Baseline)+ 19.004 19.333 0.328 1631 
(0.201) 
Has Individual Bank Account 0.565 0.532 -0.032 1654 
(0.043) 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline‡ 0.274 0.468 0.194∗∗∗ 1699 
(0.057) 
If Worked for Pay in Last Year 0.812 0.786 -0.026 1654 
(0.031) 
Earnings Last Month 866.922 679.264 -187.658 1630 
(124.650) 
Private Labor Index 0.013 -0.018 -0.031 1654 
(0.072) 
MGNREGS Labor Index -0.131 -0.046 0.085 1654 
(0.085) 
Empowerment Index 0.038 0.042 0.004 1644 
(0.033) 
Actual Norms Index -0.051 -0.124 -0.073∗∗ 1654 
(0.031) 
Perceived Norms Index: Acceptance Working Women -0.013 -0.113 -0.100∗ 1652 
(0.050) 
Perceived Norms Index: Acceptance Husbands -0.039 -0.083 -0.044 1652 
(0.051) 
Panel B: Characteristics of Husbands 
Age+ 43.841 45.089 1.248 1694 
(0.988) 
Years Education+ 3.771 4.110 0.339 1688 
(0.443) 
Has Individual Bank Account 0.829 0.837 0.008 1521 
(0.030) 
If Worked for Pay in Last Year 0.990 0.994 0.003 1521 
(0.005) 
Earnings Last Month 1325.313 1790.540 465.227∗∗∗ 1503 
(165.303) 
Private Labor Index 0.565 0.794 0.229∗∗∗ 1521 
(0.049) 
MGNREGS Labor Index 0.141 0.097 -0.044 1521 
(0.127) 
Actual Norms Index -0.008 0.083 0.091∗∗ 1521 
(0.036) 
Perceived Norms Index: Acceptance Working Women -0.106 -0.154 -0.048 1521 
(0.054) 
Perceived Norms Index: Acceptance Husbands -0.322 -0.352 -0.030 1521 
(0.052) 
Panel C: Household Characteristics 
Other Backwards Caste+ 0.525 0.446 -0.079 1614 
(0.080) 
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe+ 0.418 0.488 0.070 1614 
(0.085) 
Household Income Last Month (Male Report) 4960.051 5369.025 408.974 1518 
(465.945) 
DHS Work Index (Residualized)† 0.040 -0.049 -0.089∗∗∗ 1522 
(0.032) 
DHS Work Index (Unresidualized)† 0.060 -0.046 -0.105∗∗∗ 1522 
(0.039) 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. Sample limited to control group. The mean of the 
constrained indicator for this sample is 0.320. +Outcomes are from short run survey; otherwise, outcomes are from long 
run survey. Data from short run survey, such as age, are left as their original values. †Index constructed using the Indian 
Demographic and Health Survey V (2005-2006) and merged onto our sample at the subcaste level. The residualized 
index residualizes out female education, husband education, and the DHS wealth index within the DHS data. See Online 
Data Appendix for more details. Variables measured in INR topcoded at the 99th percentile. The exchange rate was 
approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per USD in 2017. The frst two columns show the means among 
unconstrained and constrained women. The third column shows the regression coeÿcient on an indicator variable for being 
constrained. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. 
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Table B10: Impact of Treatments on Receipt of MGNREGS Payments in Individual Accounts 
May 1, 2015 - April 30, 2018 May 1, 2015 - Nov. 30, 2017 
Bank Admin Data+ Bank Admin Data+ MGNREGS Admin Data 
Any Payment: 
Project Account 
(1) 
Value Payments: 
Project Account 
(2) 
Any Payment: 
Project Account 
(3) 
Value Payments: 
Project Account 
(4) 
Any Payment: 
Individual 
Account 
(5) 
Value Payments: 
Individual 
Account 
(6) 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.261∗∗∗ 
(0.046) 
2175.894∗∗∗ 
(483.149) 
0.277∗∗∗ 
(0.042) 
2004.488∗∗∗ 
(443.212) 
0.230∗∗∗ 
(0.032) 
1181.774∗∗∗ 
(235.112) 
γ1: Training 
γ2: Direct Deposit 
γ3: Direct Deposit × Training 
-0.027 
(0.045) 
0.099∗∗ 
(0.047) 
0.189∗∗ 
(0.074) 
-140.666 
(463.677) 
724.119∗ 
(418.066) 
1592.441∗∗ 
(686.840) 
-0.021 
(0.041) 
0.107∗∗∗ 
(0.039) 
0.191∗∗∗ 
(0.064) 
-256.439 
(389.977) 
472.592 
(347.701) 
1788.334∗∗∗ 
(564.893) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
0.126∗∗∗ 
(0.034) 
0.109∗∗ 
(0.047) 
5.249 
(166.450) 
596.901∗∗∗ 
(226.535) 
579.624∗ 
(339.762) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.135 
1993 
968.955 
1993 
0.106 
1993 
807.369 
1993 
0.053 
2440 
282.351 
2440 
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+Sample limited to GPs served by banking partner providing administrative data. 
The exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per USD in 2017. 
Table B11: Impact of Treatments on Gender-Based Violence and Mental Health 
Freedom from 
Gender-based 
Violence Index 
Mental 
Health Index 
Panel A: Full sample 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 
Short-Run 
(1) 
-0.007 
(0.039) 
Long-Run 
(2) 
0.050 
(0.033) 
Short-Run 
(3) 
-0.005 
(0.042) 
Long-Run 
(4) 
-0.081∗ 
(0.048) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.000 
2504 
-0.000 
2463 
0.000 
2501 
0.000 
2460 
Panel B: Constrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 0.067 
(0.058) 
-0.004 
(0.058) 
0.055 
(0.059) 
-0.115 
(0.072) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
-0.046 
922 
-0.000 
903 
-0.005 
922 
-0.012 
902 
Panel C: Unconstrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training -0.038 
(0.050) 
0.077∗ 
(0.040) 
-0.050 
(0.054) 
-0.053 
(0.060) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
0.024 
1519 
0.002 
1500 
0.011 
1516 
0.008 
1498 
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ 0.162 0.232 0.164 0.490 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions 
include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post 
lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their 
square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, 
** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The aggregate freedom from gender-based violence index is an 
average of the freedom from physical violence, autonomy, and freedom from emotional abuse 
sub-indices. All sub-index components are standardized with respect to the Accounts Basic 
group. The freedom from physical violence index includes indicators for if the respondent has 
not experienced each of the following in the past year: pull hair/punch/kick you, push/slap 
you, and physically force you to have sexual intercourse when you do not want to. The 
autonomy index includes if the respondent reports her husband is never jealous or angry if 
she talks to other men, never prevents her from meeting her female friends, never tries to 
limit contact with family members, and never insists on knowing where wife is at all times. 
The freedom from emotional abuse index includes indicators for if the respondent has not 
experienced each of the following in the past year: humiliated in front of others, received 
threats/harm to self or others respondent cares about, and been insulted. The aggregate 
mental health index is an average of the freedom from depression and anxiety sub-indices. 
The freedom from depression index includes indicators for if the respondent experienced the 
following (sometimes, a little, or not at all) in the past 30 days: feeling hopeless, worthless, 
depressed, and that everything was an e˙ort. The freedom from anxiety index includes 
indicators for if the respondent experienced the following (sometimes, a little, or not at all) in 
the past 30 days: feeling nervous and restless/fdgety. See Online Data Appendix for further 
details on variable construction. 
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Table B12: Robustness of Mental Health in the Long-Run Survey: Setting a Higher 
Bar for Mental Health 
Original 
Index 
Less Than 
Some Depression/ 
Anxiety 
No Depression/ 
Anxiety 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Full sample 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training -0.081∗ -0.055 0.025 
(0.048) (0.045) (0.049) 
Accts Only Mean 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
N 2460 2460 2460 
Panel B: Constrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training -0.115 -0.061 -0.017 
(0.072) (0.080) (0.083) 
Accts Only Mean -0.012 -0.032 -0.010 
N 902 902 902 
Panel C: Unconstrained Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training -0.053 -0.043 0.051 
(0.060) (0.057) (0.054) 
Accts Only Mean 0.008 0.018 0.006 
N 1498 1498 1498 
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ 0.490 0.844 0.455 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions 
include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post 
lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their 
square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** 
p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. 
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Table B13: Balance on Predetermined Demographic Characteristics: High FLFP (Unconstrained) GP’s 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accounts 
Only 
Mean 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
Accounts 
+ Training 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
+ Training 
P-Value: 
Joint Test N 
Panel A: Individual Characteristics of Eligible Women 
Age 39.151 -0.016 0.149 0.684 0.936 1176 
Years Education 0.819 0.236 -0.030 0.192 0.275 1134 
Can Read or Write 0.095 0.039 0.011 0.015 0.433 1168 
Had No Children At Time of Baseline 0.022 -0.007 -0.006 -0.018∗ 0.388 1166 
Age Had First Child (Among Women With Kids at Baseline) 18.776 0.191 0.421∗ -0.096 0.146 1142 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline (Unconstrained)† 0.722 -0.008 0.088∗ 0.038 0.196 1176 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.178 0.075 0.110∗ 0.098∗ 0.244 1057 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.513 -0.031 0.144∗ -0.050 0.112 1130 
Panel B: Individual Characteristics of Husbands 
Age 43.308 0.647 0.428 0.303 0.926 1159 
Years Education 3.974 0.255 -0.363 0.462 0.319 1151 
Can Read or Write 0.532 -0.025 -0.058 -0.035 0.715 1124 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline† 0.940 -0.015 -0.025 0.004 0.163 1176 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.315 0.050 0.013 0.050 0.804 1037 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.637 -0.061 0.034 -0.102 0.324 1065 
Panel C: Household/Couple Characteristics 
Male-Female Age Gap 4.412 0.332 0.060 -0.521 0.167 1159 
Male-Female Education Gap 3.255 -0.180 -0.350 0.121 0.791 1112 
Hindu 0.968 0.010 0.023 0.019 0.513 1168 
Scheduled Caste or Tribe 0.387 -0.039 0.199∗ -0.025 0.087∗ 1108 
Other Backward Caste 0.551 0.064 -0.202∗∗ -0.016 0.018∗∗ 1108 
Number Household Members on Job Card† 3.953 -0.219 0.298 -0.152 0.720 1176 
Panel D: GP Characteristics 
Number Eligible Women in GP 31.933 4.341 3.925 1.665 0.970 52 
Total GP Population 2618.067 131.637 145.451 -470.748 0.582 52 
Fraction GP Population Female 0.468 -0.007 0.001 0.000 0.505 52 
Fraction GP Population SC/ST 0.340 0.010 0.070 0.070 0.646 52 
Fraction Female GP Population Literate 0.377 0.006 -0.024 -0.000 0.633 52 
Fraction Male GP Population Literate 0.619 0.014 -0.027 0.006 0.793 52 
Female Workers / Female GP Population 0.428 0.011 0.028 0.038 0.522 52 
Male Workers / Male GP Population 0.535 -0.009 -0.002 0.008 0.670 52 
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. All regressions include district and strata fxed e˙ects. Regressions in Panel D are at the GP level with 
robust standard errors; otherwise, regressions are at the individual level with standard errors clustered at the GP level. Standard errors are omitted 
from the table for legibility. The frst column gives the mean among the Accounts Only group, columns 2-4 give regression coeÿcients. Column 5 
gives the p-value from a test that all treatment coeÿcients are jointly equal to zero. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01. Variables marked by † are 
from the baseline census, and variables marked by + are from the MIS data. All data in Panel D are from the Indian Census. Otherwise, data are 
from the short run survey. Data from the short run survey, such as age, are left as their original values. GP-level female labor force participation 
(FLFP) comes from the 2011 Indian Census. GP’s are considered constrained if the female labor force participation rate is below the median (among 
the sample GPs) according to the 2011 Indian Census. 
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Table B14: Balance on Predetermined Demographic Characteristics: Low FLFP (Constrained) GP’s 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accounts 
Only 
Mean 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
Accounts 
+ Training 
Accounts 
+ Direct 
Deposit 
+ Training 
P-Value: 
Joint Test N 
Panel A: Individual Characteristics of Eligible Women 
Age 41.223 -1.159 -0.374 -2.039∗ 0.284 1231 
Years Education 0.795 -0.126 -0.292 -0.054 0.417 1198 
Can Read or Write 0.121 -0.003 -0.028 0.000 0.530 1223 
Had No Children At Time of Baseline 0.020 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 0.955 1222 
Age Had First Child (Among Women With Kids at Baseline) 19.449 0.144 0.077 -0.231 0.570 1197 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline (Unconstrained)† 0.538 0.025 -0.028 -0.024 0.738 1231 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.138 -0.012 -0.044 -0.003 0.699 1081 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.525 -0.049 -0.022 0.189∗ 0.077∗ 1178 
Panel B: Individual Characteristics of Husbands 
Age 46.245 -0.592 -0.701 -1.854∗ 0.362 1200 
Years Education 4.655 -0.819 -0.546 -0.409 0.443 1187 
Can Read or Write 0.607 -0.102∗ -0.071 -0.060 0.416 1165 
Ever Worked for MGNREGS Before Baseline† 0.916 -0.014 0.014 0.045∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 1231 
Worked for MGNREGS in Past Year at Baseline† 0.319 0.023 -0.079 -0.020 0.513 1033 
In MGNREGS MIS in Past Year+ 0.671 -0.060 -0.038 0.048 0.559 1084 
Panel C: Household/Couple Characteristics 
Male-Female Age Gap 5.083 0.605 -0.041 0.244 0.377 1200 
Male-Female Education Gap 3.828 -0.642 -0.144 -0.290 0.504 1157 
Hindu 0.948 -0.003 -0.043 0.004 0.592 1223 
Scheduled Caste or Tribe 0.326 0.095 0.081 0.075 0.738 1168 
Other Backward Caste 0.564 -0.112 -0.015 -0.019 0.544 1168 
Number Household Members on Job Card† 3.940 -0.163 0.098 0.034 0.854 1231 
Panel D: GP Characteristics 
Number Eligible Women in GP 20.105 10.761∗∗ 6.622 0.541 0.108 81 
Total GP Population 3009.947 1593.017 1374.232∗ 786.774 0.273 81 
Fraction GP Population Female 0.456 0.008 0.003 0.010∗∗ 0.227 81 
Fraction GP Population SC/ST 0.222 0.001 0.053 0.060 0.267 81 
Fraction Female GP Population Literate 0.438 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.993 81 
Fraction Male GP Population Literate 0.675 -0.030 -0.003 -0.021 0.333 81 
Female Workers / Female GP Population 0.157 0.016 0.017 0.033 0.801 81 
Male Workers / Male GP Population 0.491 0.014∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.011 0.107 81 
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. All regressions include district and strata fxed e˙ects. Regressions in Panel D are at the GP level with 
robust standard errors; otherwise, regressions are at the individual level with standard errors clustered at the GP level. Standard errors are omitted 
from the table for legibility. The frst column gives the mean among the Accounts Only group, columns 2-4 give regression coeÿcients. Column 5 
gives the p-value from a test that all treatment coeÿcients are jointly equal to zero. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01. Variables marked by † are 
from the baseline census, and variables marked by + are from the MIS data. All data in Panel D are from the Indian Census. Otherwise, data are 
from the short run survey. Data from the short run survey, such as age, are left as their original values. GP-level female labor force participation 
(FLFP) comes from the 2011 Indian Census. GP’s are considered constrained if the female labor force participation rate is below the median (among 
the sample GPs) according to the 2011 Indian Census. 
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Table B15: Impact of Treatments on Main Outcomes: High/Low Village-level FLFP from 2011 Census (Part 1) 
Short Run Long Run 
Constrained Unconstrained P-value Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Table 2: Women’s Bank Use 
Account Use Index 0.291∗∗∗ 0.109 0.158 0.300∗∗∗ 0.060 0.023∗∗ 
(0.110) (0.067) (0.081) (0.067) 
Banking Autonomy Index 0.465∗∗∗ 0.006 0.000∗∗∗ 
(0.081) (0.072) 
CSP Knowledge Index 0.486∗∗∗ -0.016 0.010∗∗∗ 
(0.167) (0.097) 
Table 3: Women’s Labor Supply 
Aggregate Labor Supply Index 0.151∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.890 0.178∗∗∗ -0.090 0.010∗∗∗ 
(0.062) (0.067) (0.066) (0.080) 
MGNREGS Labor Supply Sub-Index 0.129 0.182∗∗ 0.733 0.047 -0.119 0.347 
(0.135) (0.077) (0.092) (0.151) 
Private Labor Supply Sub-Index 0.192∗∗ 0.147 0.711 0.240∗∗ -0.126 0.004∗∗∗ 
(0.080) (0.090) (0.097) (0.082) 
Table 4: Empowerment 
Aggregate Empowerment Index 0.031 0.074 0.488 0.083 0.009 0.366 
(0.042) (0.047) (0.053) (0.062) 
Purchase Index 0.086 0.075 0.908 0.158∗ 0.013 0.280 
(0.073) (0.055) (0.094) (0.095) 
Mobility in Past Year 0.024 0.047 0.767 0.008 0.012 0.964 
(0.046) (0.062) (0.044) (0.065) 
Self-Reported Decision Making -0.017 0.091 0.354 0.075 -0.025 0.320 
(0.061) (0.099) (0.071) (0.071) 
In this table, an individual is considered constrained if they reside in a village with a female labor force participation rate below 
the median rate (among the sample villages) according to the 2011 Indian Census. Each cell in columns 1-2 and 4-5 represent the 
total treatment e˙ect of direct deposit and training (θ) from a di˙erent regression. All regressions cluster robust standard errors 
at the GP level and include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of 
potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list 
of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The outcome variables, listed in the left margin, are the same outcomes 
variables used in the main table as indicated. 
Table B16: Impact of Treatments on Main Outcomes: High/Low Village-level FLFP from 2011 Census 
(Part 2) 
Long Run 
Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
(1) (2) (3) 
Table 5: Actual Norms 
Actual Norms Index (Female Report) 0.133∗∗∗ 0.059 0.408 
(0.048) (0.075) 
Personal Preferences (Female Report) 0.088∗ 0.048 0.652 
(0.050) (0.074) 
Acceptance: Working Women (Female Report) 0.164∗∗ 0.018 0.294 
(0.067) (0.120) 
Acceptance: Husbands (Female Report) 0.146∗ 0.113 0.774 
(0.075) (0.085) 
Actual Norms Index (Male Report) 0.020 -0.004 0.795 
(0.084) (0.037) 
Personal Preferences (Male Report) -0.047 -0.033 0.925 
(0.122) (0.095) 
Acceptance: Working Women (Male Report) 0.033 0.062 0.771 
(0.080) (0.060) 
Acceptance: Husbands (Male Report) 0.073 -0.073 0.203 
(0.102) (0.052) 
Table 6: Perceived Norms 
Perceived Norms Index (Female Report) 0.071 0.043 0.704 
(0.057) (0.048) 
Perceived Acceptance: Working Women (Female Report) 0.112∗ 0.037 0.364 
(0.064) (0.053) 
Perceived Acceptance: Husbands (Female Report) 0.049 0.040 0.924 
(0.063) (0.063) 
Perceived Norms Index (Male Report) 0.169∗∗ 0.048 0.242 
(0.079) (0.066) 
Perceived Acceptance: Working Women (Male Report) 0.116 0.061 0.643 
(0.088) (0.081) 
Perceived Acceptance: Husbands (Male Report) 0.224∗∗ 0.035 0.116 
(0.087) (0.081) 
In this table, an individual is considered constrained if they reside in a village with a female labor force 
participation rate below the median rate (among the sample villages) according to the 2011 Indian Census. 
Each cell in columns 1-2 represent the total treatment e˙ect of direct deposit and training (θ) from a di˙erent 
regression. All regressions cluster robust standard errors at the GP level and include strata and district fxed 
e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes 
individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of 
potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The outcome variables, listed in the left margin, are 
the same outcomes variables used in the main table as indicated. 
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Table B17: Impact of Treatments on Daily Wages 
Farm Labor Non-Farm Labor MGNREGS 
Panel A: Women 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training 
(1) 
Short-Run 
2.563 
(9.376) 
(2) 
Long-Run 
-6.059 
(6.776) 
(3) 
Short-Run 
-4.498 
(12.955) 
(4) 
Long-Run 
-0.290 
(9.983) 
(5) 
Short-Run 
-4.513 
(11.960) 
(6) 
Long-Run 
9.098 
(12.036) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
177.982 
1321 
206.740 
1731 
191.400 
275 
222.143 
280 
157.867 
234 
198.350 
226 
Panel B: Men 
θ: Direct Deposit and Training -2.756 
(8.661) 
-9.419 
(6.966) 
-14.291 
(9.931) 
-15.943∗∗ 
(7.075) 
-7.053 
(6.598) 
-7.995 
(7.901) 
Accts Only Mean 
N 
186.449 
1124 
219.845 
1588 
227.064 
988 
250.124 
1265 
183.545 
727 
222.156 
554 
P-value: Panel B θ = Panel C θ 0.539 0.646 0.513 0.209 0.851 0.229 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district 
fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual 
and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * 
p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. Sample limited to individuals who report working for specifed activity and earning 
a non-zero wage. At midline we ask for daily and weekly wages (which we convert to daily by assuming 6 working days 
per week). At endline we ask for daily wages in the high and low seasons separately, so we take the average in order 
to stay consistent with midline. Wages are top-coded at the 99th percentile within gender. The exchange rate was 
approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per USD in 2017. 
Figure B1: Timeline of Experimental Activities 
Activity 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Baseline Census
Account Opening at the CSP
Wave 1 Direct Deposit Signup
Training Sessions
Wave 2 Direct Deposit Signup
Bank Card Disbursement at the CSP
Short-Run Survey
Long-Run Survey
20172014 20152013 …
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Figure B2: Administrative Data - Use of Project Accounts Over Time 
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Notes: Administrative bank account data. All non-account openers are coded as having zero values for all measures. All outcomes are 
top-coded at the 99th percentile by month. Dashed lines demarcate the beginning and end of the short-run and long-run surveys. The 
exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per USD in 2017. 
Figure B3: Share of Women Receiving MGNREGS Payments in Individual Accounts Over 
Time 
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Notes: Data from MGNREGS MIS Table R1.2.6: Women Joint Account Detail, accessed 
at http://mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx. Figures for FY 2013-14 omit Andhra 
Pradesh, Manipur, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli due to missing data. 
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Figure B4: E˙ects of Accounts Plus Linking by Age of Youngest Child in the Household 
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Notes: This fgure graphs treatment e˙ects of Accounts + Direct Deposit + Training relative to Accounts Only by whether or not the 
household has a children under the age of eight. Whiskers give 90 and 95 percent confdence intervals on point estimates. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat level. All regressions include controls for strata, district, and additional controls 
selected via double lasso. 
Figure B5: Non-MGNREGS Activity in Project Bank Accounts 
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Notes: Administrative bank account data. All non-account openers are coded as having zero values for all measures. All outcomes are 
top-coded at the 99th percentile by month and gender. Dashed lines demarcate the beginning and end of the short-run and long-run 
surveys. The exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per USD in 2017. 
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Table C1: Impact of Treatments on Banking Sub-Index Components 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Account Use Index 
Short Run 
If Own Individual Acct 0.019 0.886 2504 0.042 0.841 922 0.007 0.912 1519 0.383 
(0.026) (0.045) (0.025) 
If Visited - 6 months 0.060 0.161 2500 0.093∗ 0.149 920 0.044 0.163 1517 0.359 
(0.037) (0.050) (0.042) 
Individual Acct Balance 63.969∗∗ 84.592 2474 75.333∗ 82.716 911 64.583∗ 82.612 1500 0.822 
(27.988) (40.361) (35.247) 
Long Run 
If Own Individual Acct 0.063∗∗ 0.827 2464 0.103∗∗ 0.759 903 0.041 0.865 1501 0.204 
(0.031) (0.045) (0.034) 
If Visited - 6 months 0.078∗∗∗ 0.181 2454 0.174∗∗∗ 0.127 897 0.015 0.209 1497 0.002∗∗∗ 
(0.028) (0.043) (0.032) 
Individual Acct Balance 30.948 228.131 2377 48.752 248.627 880 -8.081 217.986 1440 0.547 
(48.131) (86.028) (51.371) 
Panel B: Womens Banking Autonomy Index 
Visits Bank 
Alone 0.043∗ 0.107 2455 0.077∗∗ 0.070 902 0.017 0.128 1493 0.083∗ 
(0.025) (0.030) (0.032) 
Without Male Supervision 0.079∗∗ 0.188 2455 0.127∗∗∗ 0.141 902 0.040 0.209 1493 0.066∗ 
(0.035) (0.046) (0.041) 
CSP 
Comfortable Conducting Transactions 0.097∗∗ 0.605 2402 0.063 0.594 865 0.106∗∗ 0.612 1478 0.537 
(0.047) (0.071) (0.047) 
Comfortable Visiting Alone 0.093∗∗ 0.534 2415 0.138∗∗∗ 0.461 879 0.059 0.580 1477 0.170 
(0.047) (0.053) (0.053) 
Believes Can Visit Without Male 0.072 0.426 2425 0.192∗∗∗ 0.354 893 -0.010 0.466 1474 0.002∗∗∗ 
(0.049) (0.061) (0.052) 
Panel C: Women’s CSP Knowledge Index 
Heard of CSP Before 0.029 0.828 2464 0.067 0.799 903 0.009 0.849 1501 0.208 
(0.039) (0.049) (0.041) 
Num. Transactions Ever Conducted At CSP 0.207∗ 1.701 2322 0.441∗∗∗ 1.637 839 0.048 1.744 1428 0.008∗∗∗ 
(0.121) (0.170) (0.103) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are 
selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix 
for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. All monetary values are denominated in Indian Rupees and top-coded at the 
99th percentile (by gender). The exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per USD in 2017. The outcome variables in this table 
feed into the account use, banking autonomy, and CSP knowledge indices. See Online Data Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
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Table C2: Impact of Treatments on MGNREGS Labor Supply Sub-Index Components 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Self Reports 
Short Run 
Worked for MGNREGS Past Month 0.015 0.017 2504 0.031∗∗ 0.005 922 0.009 0.021 1519 0.227 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.012) 
Worked for MGNREGS Past Year 0.006 0.104 2504 0.012 0.072 922 -0.006 0.120 1519 0.555 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.028) 
Long Run 
Worked for MGNREGS Past Month -0.007 0.025 2164 0.010 0.027 847 -0.017 0.026 1262 0.267 
(0.016) (0.026) (0.016) 
Worked for MGNREGS Past Year 0.023 0.129 2196 0.053 0.090 857 -0.003 0.150 1283 0.248 
(0.030) (0.041) (0.038) 
Panel B: MIS Reports 
Short Run 
Worked for MGNREGS Past Month 0.055∗∗∗ 0.029 2504 0.072∗∗ 0.019 922 0.050∗∗ 0.035 1519 0.443 
(0.020) (0.029) (0.023) 
Worked for MGNREGS Past Year 0.090∗ 0.277 2504 0.109 0.264 922 0.073 0.294 1519 0.615 
(0.048) (0.075) (0.052) 
MGNREGS Wages Past Month 64.443∗∗ 34.681 2504 86.703∗∗ 22.933 922 60.282∗∗ 42.513 1519 0.457 
(26.590) (37.451) (29.576) 
MGNREGS Wages Past Year 153.739 641.045 2504 141.271 698.173 922 130.260 633.270 1519 0.965 
(162.520) (284.224) (144.236) 
Long Run 
Worked for MGNREGS Past Month -0.031 0.123 2464 -0.011 0.090 903 -0.047 0.146 1501 0.444 
(0.040) (0.030) (0.053) 
Worked for MGNREGS Past Year 0.071 0.288 2464 0.050 0.221 903 0.085 0.335 1501 0.570 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.063) 
MGNREGS Wages Past Month -38.126 205.928 2464 0.016 138.291 903 -67.113 250.097 1501 0.355 
(77.410) (49.847) (100.004) 
MGNREGS Wages Past Year 290.768 1318.816 2464 334.683 933.608 903 295.952 1575.897 1501 0.916 
(319.064) (283.881) (409.326) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are 
selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix 
for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 
per USD in 2017. All outcome variables in this table feed into the MGNREGS labor supply index. All monetary values are denominated in Indian Rupees 
and top-coded at the 99th percentile (by gender). See Online Data Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
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Table C3: Impact of Treatments on Labor Supply Sub-Index Components 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Private Labor Supply 
Short Run 
Primary Occupation Past Year was Worker 0.056∗∗ 0.116 2498 0.062∗∗ 0.063 919 0.055 0.142 1517 0.872 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.034) 
If Worked for Pay Last Year 0.086∗∗∗ 0.700 2504 0.153∗∗∗ 0.615 922 0.053∗ 0.746 1519 0.025∗∗ 
(0.028) (0.044) (0.031) 
Private Work Earnings Past Year 1094.189 3742.679 2303 1252.180∗ 2597.358 852 1205.542 4230.647 1393 0.966 
(686.120) (737.623) (967.725) 
Long Run 
Primary Occupation Past Year was Worker 0.001 0.631 2464 0.154∗∗ 0.462 903 -0.089∗∗ 0.727 1501 0.000∗∗∗ 
(0.039) (0.063) (0.035) 
If Worked for Pay Last Year 0.009 0.835 2464 0.103∗∗ 0.724 903 -0.048 0.903 1501 0.001∗∗∗ 
(0.029) (0.045) (0.029) 
Private Work Earnings Past Year 601.386 4020.259 2361 1605.697∗∗ 2906.048 871 126.741 4574.462 1432 0.091∗ 
(422.743) (689.693) (522.976) 
Panel B: Public/Private Labor Supply 
Short Run 
If Worked for Pay Past Month 0.077∗∗∗ 0.203 2469 0.113∗∗∗ 0.112 913 0.075∗ 0.248 1493 0.414 
(0.029) (0.034) (0.039) 
Earnings Past Month 68.682 278.362 2459 72.516 196.488 912 98.447 304.903 1485 0.742 
(48.739) (55.574) (64.458) 
Months Worked Past Year 0.748∗∗ 4.224 2481 1.227∗∗ 3.638 918 0.460 4.507 1500 0.134 
(0.343) (0.495) (0.378) 
Long Run 
If Worked for Pay Past Month 0.020 0.579 2463 0.108∗∗ 0.465 902 -0.035 0.646 1501 0.008∗∗∗ 
(0.040) (0.045) (0.048) 
Earnings Past Month 129.720 636.506 2403 360.485∗∗ 488.474 880 -27.900 703.151 1464 0.009∗∗∗ 
(118.763) (142.962) (120.662) 
Months Worked Past Year 0.228 3.132 2416 0.453 2.546 890 0.158 3.463 1467 0.476 
(0.266) (0.375) (0.308) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected 
using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete 
list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The exchange rate was approximately INR 64 per USD in 2015 and INR 65 per USD in 2017. All 
outcome variables in this table feed into the private labor or general labor supply indices. All monetary values are denominated in Indian Rupees and top-coded at 
the 99th percentile (by gender). See Online Data Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
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Table C4: Impact of Treatments on Norms Sub-Index Components: Female Report 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Personal Preferences 
Believes Women Can Work 0.034 0.784 2461 0.073 0.759 903 0.020 0.797 1498 0.356 
(0.028) (0.046) (0.036) 
Prefers Daughter-in-Law Who Works 0.062∗ 0.350 2464 0.056 0.322 903 0.059 0.370 1501 0.959 
(0.033) (0.051) (0.042) 
Prefers Son-in-Law Who Allows Wife to Work 0.035 0.247 2464 0.080∗∗ 0.211 903 0.003 0.270 1501 0.100 
(0.026) (0.040) (0.033) 
Panel B: Acceptance of Working Women 
Believes Working Woman is: 
Better Wife 0.075∗∗ 0.542 2463 0.167∗∗∗ 0.487 902 0.007 0.576 1501 0.006∗∗∗ 
(0.035) (0.051) (0.039) 
Better Mother 0.025 0.511 2463 0.104∗∗ 0.457 902 -0.022 0.535 1501 0.048∗∗ 
(0.038) (0.047) (0.049) 
Better Caretaker 0.035 0.503 2464 0.071∗ 0.462 903 0.025 0.516 1501 0.459 
(0.031) (0.043) (0.044) 
Panel C: Acceptance of Working Women’s Husbands 
Believes Working Woman’s Husband is: 
Better Provider 0.056∗ 0.490 2463 0.107∗∗ 0.449 902 0.004 0.508 1501 0.063∗ 
(0.030) (0.044) (0.038) 
Better Husband 0.043 0.499 2464 0.109∗∗∗ 0.422 903 0.016 0.535 1501 0.065∗ 
(0.035) (0.040) (0.043) 
Panel D: Perceived Norms 
Frac. Community Who Will Not Think Poorly of Working Woman 0.019 0.619 2457 0.010 0.595 901 0.021 0.636 1496 0.722 
(0.018) (0.029) (0.019) 
Working Woman is Viewed With More Respect 0.046 0.519 2462 0.079∗∗ 0.497 902 0.016 0.528 1500 0.262 
(0.029) (0.040) (0.039) 
Frac. Community Who Will Not Think Poorly of Husband -0.003 0.593 2459 0.025 0.558 901 -0.028∗ 0.613 1498 0.119 
(0.014) (0.029) (0.016) 
Working Woman’s Husband is Viewed With More Respect 0.053∗ 0.525 2461 0.087∗ 0.500 901 0.017 0.539 1500 0.202 
(0.031) (0.048) (0.036) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using 
double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential 
controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. These questions were only asked in the long run survey. The outcome variables in this table feed into the actual norms and 
perceived norms sub-indices, which then feed into the aggregate norms index. See Online Data Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
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Table C5: Impact of Treatments on Norms Sub-Index Components: Male Report 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Personal Preferences 
Believes Women Can Work 0.006 0.674 2293 0.051 0.631 837 -0.017 0.688 1403 0.298 
(0.034) (0.061) (0.036) 
Prefers Daughter-in-Law Who Works -0.022 0.500 2293 -0.029 0.481 837 -0.012 0.510 1403 0.772 
(0.039) (0.056) (0.042) 
Prefers Son-in-Law Who Allows Wife to Work -0.062 0.459 2293 -0.012 0.406 837 -0.079 0.484 1403 0.317 
(0.040) (0.055) (0.051) 
Panel B: Acceptance of Working Women 
Believes Working Woman is: 
Better Wife -0.011 0.585 2280 0.043 0.565 829 -0.038 0.598 1398 0.202 
(0.034) (0.055) (0.041) 
Better Mother 0.006 0.461 2285 -0.016 0.495 832 0.023 0.444 1400 0.523 
(0.034) (0.053) (0.038) 
Better Caretaker 0.029 0.511 2282 -0.054 0.565 830 0.076∗ 0.477 1399 0.037∗∗ 
(0.028) (0.043) (0.039) 
Panel C: Acceptance of Working Women’s Husbands 
Believes Working Woman’s Husband is: 
Better Provider 0.004 0.516 2281 -0.036 0.513 833 0.016 0.515 1396 0.455 
(0.030) (0.059) (0.033) 
Better Husband -0.041 0.522 2283 -0.062 0.538 831 -0.033 0.520 1399 0.621 
(0.034) (0.057) (0.037) 
Panel D: Perceived Norms 
Frac. Community Who Will Not Think Poorly of Working Woman 0.001 0.561 2288 0.019 0.527 835 0.005 0.578 1400 0.734 
(0.020) (0.037) (0.022) 
Working Woman is Viewed With More Respect 0.045 0.486 2288 -0.003 0.497 833 0.080∗ 0.477 1402 0.212 
(0.032) (0.050) (0.043) 
Frac. Community Who Will Not Think Poorly of Husband 0.034∗∗ 0.430 2283 0.075∗∗∗ 0.379 832 0.021 0.457 1398 0.086∗ 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.020) 
Working Woman’s Husband is Viewed With More Respect 0.047 0.512 2286 0.031 0.513 834 0.054 0.509 1399 0.741 
(0.034) (0.059) (0.040) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using 
double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential 
controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. These questions were only asked in the long run survey. The outcome variables in this table feed into the actual norms and 
perceived norms sub-indices, which then feed into the aggregate norms index. See Data Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
Table C6: Impact of Treatments on Purchase Sub-Index Components 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Purhcase Index - Woman has made purchases for [ activity] 
Short Run 
Food 0.076∗∗∗ 0.482 2504 0.138∗∗∗ 0.428 922 0.029 0.503 1519 0.129 
(0.028) (0.045) (0.045) 
Clothing 0.022 0.384 2504 0.068 0.370 922 -0.004 0.393 1519 0.237 
(0.030) (0.052) (0.035) 
Child Health 0.039 0.441 2504 0.075 0.394 922 0.034 0.463 1519 0.542 
(0.030) (0.051) (0.040) 
Home Improvement -0.009 0.243 2504 0.033 0.192 922 -0.021 0.265 1519 0.176 
(0.027) (0.039) (0.028) 
Festivals 0.053 0.374 2504 0.101∗∗ 0.332 922 0.045 0.388 1519 0.287 
(0.037) (0.047) (0.047) 
Food Outside Home 0.053 0.344 2504 0.158∗∗∗ 0.288 922 -0.001 0.372 1519 0.010∗∗ 
(0.033) (0.052) (0.040) 
Long Run 
Food 0.030 0.730 2462 0.138∗∗∗ 0.596 902 -0.034 0.803 1500 0.002∗∗∗ 
(0.029) (0.045) (0.036) 
Clothing -0.032 0.608 2462 0.070 0.510 902 -0.088∗∗ 0.654 1500 0.029∗∗ 
(0.032) (0.053) (0.041) 
Child Health 0.008 0.659 2456 0.103∗∗∗ 0.548 898 -0.040 0.710 1498 0.004∗∗∗ 
(0.028) (0.038) (0.035) 
Home Improvement 0.005 0.478 2461 0.038 0.414 901 -0.005 0.497 1500 0.539 
(0.043) (0.056) (0.052) 
Festivals 0.023 0.641 2463 0.126∗∗ 0.535 902 -0.029 0.692 1501 0.007∗∗∗ 
(0.032) (0.052) (0.035) 
Food Outside Home 0.053 0.634 2463 0.123∗∗∗ 0.535 902 0.025 0.678 1501 0.064∗ 
(0.032) (0.047) (0.037) 
Panel B: Purchase Index - Woman sometimes/always uses own funds for [ activity] 
Short Run 
Food 0.062∗∗ 0.424 2504 0.136∗∗∗ 0.375 922 0.019 0.444 1519 0.047∗∗ 
(0.031) (0.046) (0.039) 
Clothing 0.043 0.317 2504 0.083∗ 0.298 922 0.029 0.329 1519 0.334 
(0.030) (0.050) (0.040) 
Child Health 0.059∗ 0.376 2504 0.100∗∗ 0.327 922 0.056 0.396 1519 0.465 
(0.031) (0.049) (0.040) 
Home Improvement 0.002 0.210 2504 0.040 0.163 922 -0.020 0.227 1519 0.108 
(0.029) (0.040) (0.030) 
Festivals 0.067∗ 0.327 2504 0.107∗∗ 0.303 922 0.062 0.332 1519 0.399 
(0.038) (0.049) (0.047) 
Food Outside Home 0.044 0.302 2504 0.132∗∗∗ 0.255 922 0.003 0.324 1519 0.036∗∗ 
(0.036) (0.050) (0.044) 
Long Run 
Food 0.047 0.600 2462 0.166∗∗∗ 0.475 902 -0.028 0.665 1500 0.002∗∗∗ 
(0.040) (0.054) (0.045) 
Clothing 0.003 0.509 2462 0.118∗∗ 0.384 902 -0.053 0.565 1500 0.012∗∗ 
(0.041) (0.057) (0.046) 
Child Health 0.028 0.547 2456 0.131∗∗∗ 0.426 898 -0.025 0.604 1498 0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.038) (0.047) (0.046) 
Home Improvement -0.010 0.419 2461 0.056 0.333 901 -0.036 0.454 1500 0.209 
(0.046) (0.058) (0.055) 
Festivals 0.044 0.540 2463 0.181∗∗∗ 0.429 902 -0.027 0.589 1501 0.000∗∗∗ 
(0.039) (0.055) (0.040) 
Food Outside Home 0.048 0.540 2463 0.169∗∗∗ 0.419 902 -0.009 0.595 1501 0.001∗∗∗ 
(0.041) (0.052) (0.043) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed 
e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-
level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** 
p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The outcome variables in this table feed into purchase sub-indices which then feed into the aggregate 
empowerment index. See Online Data Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
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Table C7: Impact of Treatments on Empowerment Sub-Index Components 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Decision Making Index - Makes decisions about [ activity] 
Short Run 
Spending Earnings 0.025 0.483 2456 0.049 0.498 906 0.026 0.470 1489 0.685 
(0.031) (0.045) (0.039) 
Taking Employment -0.037 0.264 2441 -0.001 0.205 893 -0.050 0.297 1487 0.340 
(0.028) (0.038) (0.039) 
Long Run 
Spending Earnings 0.015 0.397 2460 0.061 0.379 901 0.003 0.397 1499 0.332 
(0.024) (0.049) (0.030) 
Taking Employment -0.000 0.281 2455 0.004 0.222 900 -0.006 0.313 1495 0.829 
(0.029) (0.043) (0.033) 
Panel C: Mobility Index - If Visited [ location] in Past Month 
Short Run 
Market 0.004 0.519 2481 0.042 0.527 911 -0.026 0.522 1507 0.260 
(0.038) (0.047) (0.047) 
District Market 0.005 0.178 2494 0.029 0.203 915 -0.000 0.161 1516 0.604 
(0.029) (0.050) (0.031) 
Natal Home -0.036 0.301 2487 -0.037 0.329 913 -0.038 0.287 1511 0.979 
(0.030) (0.053) (0.028) 
Anganwadi 0.070∗∗ 0.182 2489 0.100∗∗∗ 0.144 914 0.059∗ 0.201 1512 0.367 
(0.029) (0.039) (0.034) 
PHC -0.021 0.265 2492 -0.053 0.327 914 0.013 0.228 1515 0.142 
(0.029) (0.043) (0.033) 
Long Run 
Market -0.003 0.511 2356 0.040 0.460 869 -0.027 0.541 1428 0.270 
(0.034) (0.048) (0.044) 
District Market 0.025 0.100 2373 0.054 0.104 865 0.018 0.096 1450 0.373 
(0.026) (0.036) (0.029) 
Natal Home 0.057 0.239 2346 0.037 0.258 866 0.073 0.230 1421 0.545 
(0.039) (0.051) (0.046) 
Anganwadi 0.035 0.185 2248 0.062 0.147 829 0.005 0.211 1360 0.249 
(0.030) (0.041) (0.039) 
PHC 0.029 0.239 2264 0.022 0.222 837 0.033 0.249 1368 0.850 
(0.034) (0.050) (0.040) 
Panel B: Mobility Index - If Visited [ location] in Past Year 
Short Run 
Market 0.016 0.809 2481 0.046 0.797 911 -0.001 0.814 1507 0.367 
(0.032) (0.045) (0.038) 
District Market -0.046 0.446 2494 -0.044 0.546 915 -0.051 0.394 1516 0.892 
(0.043) (0.050) (0.052) 
Natal Home 0.054∗∗ 0.837 2487 0.022 0.865 913 0.079∗∗∗ 0.818 1511 0.164 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.030) 
Anganwadi 0.089∗∗ 0.314 2489 0.091∗ 0.284 914 0.098∗∗ 0.330 1512 0.919 
(0.039) (0.048) (0.048) 
PHC 0.009 0.645 2492 -0.080∗∗ 0.732 914 0.055 0.603 1515 0.011∗∗ 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.047) 
Long Run 
Market -0.010 0.745 2356 0.067 0.658 869 -0.066∗ 0.792 1428 0.012∗∗ 
(0.031) (0.042) (0.038) 
District Market -0.037 0.394 2373 -0.028 0.479 865 -0.035 0.346 1450 0.899 
(0.040) (0.055) (0.046) 
Natal Home -0.012 0.886 2346 0.029 0.876 866 -0.043 0.895 1421 0.109 
(0.020) (0.029) (0.029) 
Anganwadi 0.072 0.408 2248 0.140∗∗ 0.342 829 0.021 0.446 1360 0.073∗ 
(0.048) (0.058) (0.059) 
PHC 0.024 0.733 2264 0.081 0.703 837 -0.028 0.754 1368 0.087∗ 
(0.038) (0.052) (0.044) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are selected using 
double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Data Appendix for the complete list of potential 
controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The outcome variables in this table feed into decision and mobility sub-indices which then feed into the aggregate 
empowerment index. See Online Data Appendix for further details on variable construction. 
75 
Table C8: Impact of Treatments on Gender Based Violence Sub-Index Components 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Freedom from Physical Violence - If Woman has Not Experienced [ physical violence type] in Past Year 
Short Run 
No Punching, Pulling Hair, or Kicking -0.026 0.836 2504 0.019 0.827 922 -0.046 0.840 1519 0.148 
(0.024) (0.035) (0.031) 
No Pushing or Slapping 0.016 0.884 2504 0.040 0.875 922 0.002 0.890 1519 0.263 
(0.019) (0.025) (0.025) 
No Forcing Sexual Intercourse -0.038 0.779 2504 0.009 0.755 922 -0.061∗ 0.791 1519 0.233 
(0.032) (0.056) (0.033) 
Long Run 
No Punching, Pulling Hair, or Kicking 0.010 0.853 2444 -0.029 0.873 895 0.014 0.847 1490 0.310 
(0.019) (0.036) (0.023) 
No Pushing or Slapping 0.014 0.911 2454 0.010 0.910 901 0.027 0.908 1493 0.592 
(0.016) (0.026) (0.021) 
No Forcing Sexual Intercourse 0.001 0.863 2455 -0.019 0.844 901 0.007 0.870 1495 0.577 
(0.025) (0.044) (0.027) 
Panel B: Autonomy - Husband Does Not Limit His Wife’s Autonomy 
Short Run 
Never Jealous if Talks to Other Men 0.022 0.539 2499 0.038 0.553 921 0.021 0.532 1515 0.796 
(0.033) (0.045) (0.044) 
Never Prevents Meeting Female Friends 0.036 0.815 2501 0.070 0.774 922 0.024 0.837 1516 0.390 
(0.029) (0.046) (0.035) 
Never Limits Contact With Family 0.021 0.913 2501 0.013 0.909 922 0.025 0.917 1516 0.725 
(0.019) (0.030) (0.022) 
Does Not Insist on Knowing Location At All Times -0.014 0.581 2500 0.023 0.538 922 -0.032 0.604 1515 0.365 
(0.037) (0.053) (0.045) 
Long Run 
Never Jealous if Talks to Other Men -0.009 0.632 2422 -0.016 0.638 888 0.006 0.632 1476 0.721 
(0.026) (0.044) (0.037) 
Never Prevents Meeting Female Friends 0.058∗∗ 0.784 2313 0.040 0.775 828 0.065∗ 0.788 1430 0.693 
(0.027) (0.046) (0.037) 
Never Limits Contact With Family 0.022 0.911 2443 0.037 0.908 895 0.017 0.915 1490 0.607 
(0.019) (0.038) (0.018) 
Does Not Insist on Knowing Location At All Times -0.012 0.606 2448 -0.038 0.611 898 -0.001 0.605 1491 0.576 
(0.031) (0.050) (0.041) 
Panel C: Emotional Abuse - If Woman Has Not Experienced [ emotional abuse type] in Past Year 
Short Run 
Not Humiliated In Front of Others -0.010 0.876 2504 -0.008 0.875 922 -0.006 0.874 1519 0.978 
(0.022) (0.041) (0.026) 
Not Threatened 0.010 0.884 2504 0.054 0.861 922 -0.007 0.896 1519 0.125 
(0.020) (0.034) (0.023) 
Not Insulted -0.039 0.732 2504 0.000 0.688 922 -0.058 0.751 1519 0.296 
(0.031) (0.042) (0.041) 
Long Run 
Not Humiliated In Front of Others 0.002 0.903 2450 -0.032 0.904 898 0.023 0.902 1492 0.166 
(0.018) (0.031) (0.022) 
Not Threatened 0.029∗ 0.911 2455 0.006 0.924 900 0.039∗∗ 0.905 1495 0.295 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.019) 
Not Insulted 0.036∗ 0.793 2449 0.030 0.774 895 0.039∗ 0.803 1494 0.847 
(0.020) (0.038) (0.024) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates are 
selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data Appendix for 
the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The outcome variables in this table feed into the freedom from physical violence, 
autonomy, and emotional abuse sub-indices, which then feed into the aggregate freedom from gender-based violence index. See Online Data Appendix for 
further details on variable construction. 
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Table C9: Impact of Treatments on Mental Health Sub-Index Components 
Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained P-value 
θ Mean N θ Mean N θ Mean N Const=Unconst 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Freedom From Depression - Has Not Experienced [ depression symptom] All or Most of the Time in the Past 30 Days 
Short Run 
Not Hopeless -0.012 0.770 2491 -0.001 0.773 918 -0.009 0.767 1511 0.872 
(0.027) (0.041) (0.032) 
Not Worthless 0.039 0.747 2493 0.088∗∗ 0.728 918 0.005 0.759 1512 0.087∗ 
(0.028) (0.040) (0.036) 
Not Depressed -0.016 0.739 2492 0.004 0.734 918 -0.035 0.746 1511 0.467 
(0.024) (0.042) (0.031) 
Not Feeling Like Everything Requires E˙ort 0.013 0.729 2489 0.043 0.725 917 -0.011 0.732 1509 0.263 
(0.031) (0.039) (0.036) 
Long Run 
Not Hopeless -0.048∗∗ 0.919 2453 -0.048∗ 0.913 899 -0.048∗ 0.924 1494 0.997 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
Not Worthless -0.033∗∗ 0.910 2455 -0.035 0.919 901 -0.035∗ 0.910 1494 1.000 
(0.016) (0.027) (0.020) 
Not Depressed -0.014 0.889 2456 0.018 0.843 901 -0.036 0.915 1495 0.204 
(0.022) (0.034) (0.025) 
Not Feeling Like Everything Requires E˙ort -0.027 0.922 2451 -0.026 0.904 899 -0.025 0.932 1492 0.968 
(0.017) (0.027) (0.019) 
Panel B: Freedom From Anxiety - Has Not Experienced [ anxiety symptom] All or Most of the Time in the Past 30 Days 
Short Run 
Not Nervous 0.013 0.741 2494 0.037 0.760 920 -0.010 0.737 1512 0.316 
(0.026) (0.039) (0.032) 
Not Restless -0.029 0.765 2494 -0.001 0.750 918 -0.044 0.778 1513 0.362 
(0.022) (0.033) (0.030) 
Long Run 
Not Nervous -0.019 0.903 2457 -0.036 0.909 902 -0.005 0.899 1495 0.365 
(0.018) (0.029) (0.021) 
Not Restless -0.007 0.903 2452 -0.053∗ 0.914 900 0.017 0.896 1492 0.067∗ 
(0.018) (0.030) (0.024) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the GP level in parentheses. All regressions include strata and district fxed e˙ects. Additional covariates 
are selected using double post lasso. The set of potential controls includes individual and GP-level characteristics and their square. See Online Data 
Appendix for the complete list of potential controls. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10. The outcome variables in this table feed into the freedom 
from anxiety and depression sub-indices, which then feed into the aggregate mental health index. See Online Data Appendix for further details on 
variable construction. 
Online Data Appendix 
The Online Data Appendix, which contains additional detail on variable construction and a 
list of lasso controls, is available here: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1R2tduuO8ZoJrdTJlOHXePjRwY_ix7kdG. 
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